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Abstract
Operating systems and low-level applications are usually written in languages
like C and assembly, which provide access to low-level abstractions. These languages
have unsafe type systems that allow many bugs to slip by programmers. For exam-
ple, in 1988, the Internet Worm exploited several insecure points in Unix including
the finger command. A call to finger with an unexpected argument caused a buffer
overflow, leading to the shutdown of most Internet traffic. A finger application writ-
ten in a type-safe language would have prevented its exploit and limited the points
the Internet Worm could attack. Such vulnerabilities are unacceptable in security-
critical applications such as the secure coprocessors of the Marianas network [11, 21],
secStore key storage from Plan 9 [6], and self-securing storage [25].
This research focuses on safe language techniques for building OS components
that cannot cause memory or IO errors. For example, an Ethernet device driver
communicates with its device through IO operations. The device depends on FIFO
queues to send and receive packets. A mistake in an IO operation can overflow or
underflow the FIFO queues, cause memory errors, or cause configuration inconsis-
tencies on the device. Data structures such as FIFO queues can be written safely in
safe languages such as Java and ML but these languages do not allow the access to
the low-level resources that an OS programmer needs. Therefore, safe OS compo-
nents require a language that combines the safety of Java with the low-level control
of C.
My research formalizes the concurrency, locks, and system state needed by the
safety-critical areas of a device driver. These formal concepts are built on top of
an abstract syntax and rules that guarantees basic memory safety using linear and
singleton types to implement safe memory load and store operations. I proved that
the improved abstract machine retains the property of soundness, which means that
all well-typed programs will be able to execute until they reach an approved end-
ii
state. Together, the concurrency, locks, and state provide safety for IO operations
and data structures.
Using the OSKit from the University of Utah as a starting point, I developed
a small operating system. I ported the 3c509 Ethernet device driver from C to
Clay, a C-like type-safe language that uses a type system powerful enough to enforce
invariants about low-level devices and data structures. The resulting driver works
safely in a multi-threaded environment. It is guaranteed to obtain locks before using
shared data. It cannot cause a FIFO queue to overflow or underflow and it will only
call IO operations when invariants are satisfied.
This type-safe driver demonstrates an actual working application of the theoret-
ical components of my research. The abstract machine is powerful enough to encode
a given OS specification and enforce a provably matching implementation. These
results lead towards fundamentally secure computing environments.
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1 Introduction
Despite advances in programming languages and programming techniques, today’s
operating systems often contain bugs. These bugs can be exploited by malicious
hackers to allow undesirable actions to occur. For example, in 1988, the Inter-
net Worm exploited Unix’s finger command using a buffer overflow, leading to the
shutdown of most Internet traffic. Such vulnerabilities are unacceptable in security-
critical applications such as the secure coprocessors of the Marianas network [11, 21],
secStore key storage from Plan 9 [6], and self-securing storage [25].
Bugs are not just present in older operating systems. The SecurityFocus Vul-
nerabilities Archive [24] collects reports of security vulnerabilities found in current
operating systems and applications. Hundreds of bugs have been reported this year
alone. SecurityFocus also lists the consequences of the bugs including buffer over-
flows, code injection, circumvented read/write permissions, keystroke interception,
private information disclosure, and root password theft.
A study by Chou et al. [4] examined the number and location of bugs in the
Linux OS. The most frequent bugs found were:
• Calling blocking functions with interrupts disabled or a lock held.
• Returning NULL pointers from routines.
• Allocating stack variables that don’t fit on the fixed-size kernel stack.
• Making inconsistent assumptions about whether a pointer is NULL.
• Not checking array bounds or loop bounds from user input.
• Not releasing locks or double locking.
• Not restoring disabled interrupts.
• Using freed memory.
One reason for the presence of bugs in operating systems is that most are writ-
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ten in non-type-safe languages like C and assembly. Writing applications in a safe
language (Java, ML) would eliminate many vulnerabilities. Java, for example, can
detect NULL pointers and inserts run-time checks for array bounds. It also imple-
ments locks in clauses which both acquire and release so the releasing step cannot
be forgotten. Java’s garbage collector ensures that memory is not freed until the
operating system is done using it. However, safe languages such as Java and ML
are not used for operating systems programming because they do not easily give
programmers access to the low-level resources they need. For example, Java does
not allow the casting of one data type to any other data type. Only a limited set
of casts are allowed. Java also cannot perform the atomic operations provided by
assembly calls or make IO calls without calling C functions. C and assembly, while
not type-safe, provide easy access to such low-level abstractions.
This research focuses on type-safe language techniques for building OS compo-
nents that cannot cause memory or IO errors. For example, an Ethernet device
driver communicates with its device through IO operations. The device depends
on FIFO queues to send and receive packets. A mistake in an IO operation can
overflow or underflow the FIFO queues, cause memory errors, or cause configuration
inconsistencies on the device.
My research formalizes the concurrency, locks, and system state needed by the
safety-critical areas of an operating system. These formal concepts are built on top
of an abstract syntax and rules that guarantee basic memory safety using linear and
singleton types to implement safe memory load and store operations. Together, the
concurrency, locks, and state provide safety for IO operations and data structures.
I proved that the improved abstract machine retains the property of soundness,
which means that all well-typed programs will be able to execute until they reach
an approved end-state. Any well-typed program respects the abstractions of its
language. A type checker for a language that implements the abstract machine will
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catch violations of the driver’s safety abstractions.
Using the OSKit from the University of Utah as a starting point, I developed a
small multi-threaded operating system. The OS runs several network applications
including ping, and uses the 3c509 Ethernet device driver. I ported the driver from
C to Clay, a C-like type-safe language that matches the abstract machine. Chou
et al. [4] found that the device drivers, which accounted for 70% of the OS code,
accounted for almost 90% of the bugs. The researchers list possible explanations for
the unexpectedly high error rates of drivers. One likely explanation is that drivers
are written by a wide range of programmers who know the device very well but
may be unfamiliar with the kernel interface. The programmers are likely to make
mistakes and, using cut and paste, propagate the mistakes over many drivers. The
I/O hardware is often incorrectly documented which leads to programmers trying to
cope with an incorrect specification.
The resulting driver works safely in a multi-threaded environment. It is guar-
anteed to obtain locks before using shared data. It cannot cause a FIFO queue to
overflow or underflow and it will only call IO operations when invariants are satisfied.
3
2 Type Systems and Safe Languages
Not all type systems are equally powerful; a weak static type system forces the
language to perform run-time safety checks. For example, type-safe languages like
Java and ML perform automatic run-time checks on array bounds. Unsafe languages
(C, C++) expect the programmer to include run-time checks. In a large program
such as an OS, there are likely to be many run-time bounds checks that are left
out or slow the program down considerably. The study by Chou et al. discussed
in section 1 found many forgotten bounds checks in Linux. The inserted run-time
bound checks are one reason that operating systems are not usually written in Java.
If these checks could be moved to compile-time, the program would have the same
safety guarantees without continual run-time bounds checks. For the purposes of
this thesis, safe means that a specification (such as Java’s “no bounds are violated”)
is enforced through compile-time and run-time checks.
In addition, none of the languages mentioned above are able to catch aliasing
errors automatically. An aliasing error occurs when several copies, or aliases, of
a system-state value are in existence and the system-state changes and then an
outdated copy is mistakenly used. Some aliasing errors could be caught by keeping
and checking reference counts but this would contribute to the already expensive run-
time checks. Compile time checks for aliasing errors would provide safety without
adding to the run time burden.
Advanced types such as integer arithmetic, singleton, and linear types offer a
compile-time solution. This section discusses static techniques for array bounds
check elimination and alias elimination.
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T // return type
array_get // function name
[int N, type T, int I; 0<=I && I<N] // type parameters
(Array[N,T] array, Int[I] i); // function parameters
void array_set [int N, type T, int I; 0<=I && I<N]
(Array[N,T] array, Int[I] i, T t);
Figure 1: These array access functions use singleton types and arithmetic com-
parisons to avoid run-time bounds checks.
2.1 Integer Arithmetic and Singleton Types
Usually, array bounds checks are required at run-time because the exact index into
the array and the exact size of the array aren’t known until run-time. If information
about the index and size was captured in the static type system, bounds checks could
be performed at compile-time rather than at run-time. Doing so requires a system
for statically reasoning about the run-time values of index and size.
Xi and Pfenning [31] added arguments to integer types and added arithmetic
capabilities (==, ! =, <, >, +,−) to their type system in order to make comparisons
between type arguments. These additions let them write invariants such as 0 ≤
index < size into their function types. To connect these type variables to the run-
time variables they used singleton types. A singleton type is a type with one element.
The singleton type Int[3] is the type of integers whose value is 3.
Together, the singleton types and arithmetic comparisons allowed them to encode
invariants about the run-time values of an index and array size. They demonstrated
how to eliminate run-time array bounds checks using these invariants. Though their
examples used ML, this section uses the syntax of Clay (a safe variant of C with
polymorphism).
The array access functions in Figure 1 avoid run time bounds checks on the array
access by using singleton types and arithmetic comparisons. The square brackets
after the function name contain type parameters and arithmetic comparisons on
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those parameters. The types of function parameters use the type parameters. The
type Array[N, T ] is an array of length N containing values of type T . The type
Int[I] is a singleton integer whose value is I. The array get function takes an array
of length N containing values of type T and an index with value I and returns a
value of type T . array set takes an array of length N containing values of type T ,
an index with value I, and a value of type T and returns nothing. These functions
and the array type are polymorphic and will work with any type of array. In this
example, the comparisons state that the index must be both greater than or equal
to 0 and less than the length of the array.
Type comparisons are checked at compile time. When the array get function is
called on an array and an index
Array[6,int] array = ...;
int x = array_get(array, 4);
where array has type Array[6, int] and 4 has type Int[4], the compiler compares the
input and parameter types and gets the following facts:
N == 6, T == int, I == 4
From there, the compiler generates the constraint
0 <= I && I < N
as shown in the function header. Using the above mentioned facts, this constraint is
equivalent to
0 <= 4 && 4 < 6
As long as these constraints are true, the function call is safe and won’t violate array
boundaries. Since this is checked at compile time, the code does not need a run-time
6
void swap
[int M, type T, int J, int K; 0<=J && 0<=K && J<M && K<M]
(Array[M,T] array, Int[J] j, Int[K] k)
{
let temp = array_get(array, j);
array_set(array, j, array_get(array, k));
array_set(array, k, temp);
}
Figure 2: This array swap function uses singleton types and arithmetic compar-
isons to avoid run-time bounds checks.
bounds check. Calls to the array set function generate similar constraints.
Figure 2 shows a more complex example of compile-time bounds checks. The
swap function swaps two values in an array using the array get and array set func-
tions defined in Figure 1. swap takes the indices of these values as singleton integers
to relate their values to the array length. The arithmetic comparisons between the
singleton integers and the array length ensure that the indices are legal array in-
dices. Assuming that a call to swap follows the invariants stated by its arithmetic
comparisons, the following facts are known:
0 <= J && 0 <= K && J < M && K < M
Inside the swap functions, there are two calls to array get. The first call uses the
facts known in the swap function and produces these facts and constraints:
N == M, T == T, I == J, 0 <= J && J < M
The second call produces the constraints:
N == M, T == T, I == K, 0 <= K && K < M
At a glance the facts known in swap imply the constraints in the two calls to
7
Array[6,int] array = ...;
let a = get_index_from_user();
let b = get_index_from_user();
swap(array, a, b);
Figure 3: A function call whose inputs are user entered without a run-time bounds
check is unsafe.
Array[6,int] array = ...;
let a = get_index_from_user();
int b = get_int_from_user();
if (0<=a && a<6 && 0<=b && b<6)
swap(array, a, b);
Figure 4: A function call whose inputs are safely user entered. The bounds check
makes the function call safe.
array get. These constraints allow the compiler to verify that calls to swap that
obey its input comparisons will make safe calls to array set and array get.
The constraints shown above are fairly simple to check. However, checking many
such constraints by hand would be tedious. Xi and Pfenning [31] showed that con-
straints produced by type checking can be solved efficiently using an automated
constraint checker such as Omega [23].
Some run-time bounds checks cannot be avoided. Statically type checking bounds
on user input can be difficult since the input values won’t be known until run-
time. With singleton types and arithmetic comparisons, the call to swap in Figure 3
generates the constraint
∅ =⇒ (0 ≤ J && 0 ≤ K && J < M && K < M)
which fails to type check since “nothing” cannot imply (0 ≤ J && 0 ≤ K && J <
M && K < M). To pass the type checker, the programmer needs to add an if-then
statement as seen in Figure 4 and only call swap if its invariants are met. Even
though this situation requires run-time bounds checking to be safe, the function
invariant helps because its presence forces the programmer to include a bounds
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LinArray[N,T] lin_array_set
[int N, type T, int I; 0<=I && I<N]
(LinArray[N,T] array, Int[I] i, T t);
LinArray[6,int] array_a = ....;
let array_b = array_a; // array_a is now invalid
lin_array_set(array_a, 4, 0); // fails: array_a invalid
lin_array_set(array_b, 4, 0); // array_b is now invalid
Figure 5: An array set function for linear arrays. A linear variable is invalid
between being read and being written.
check on the user input that might otherwise be forgotten. Safe languages such as
Java insert many run time bounds checks during compilation instead of requiring
the programmer to insert them.
2.2 Linear Types
There aren’t many easy ways to use run-time checks to avoid aliasing errors. Ref-
erence counting is sometimes possible but can have a high cost in running time.
Types based on the linear logic of Girard are used to prevent aliasing errors without
run-time checks [29].
A linear value has only one reference to it. A linear variable is able to be accessed
exactly once and cannot be duplicated or discarded. Any attempt to copy a linear
variable creates a duplicate but invalidates the original. Therefore, linear variables
are explicitly handed from one function to the next. Figure 5 shows a linear array.
Creating array b invalidates array a so future attempts to set index 4 to a 0 are
type errors. The second call to lin array set sets index 4 of array b to 0 but doesn’t
catch the returned array so array b also becomes invalid. A safe call to lin array set
would look like:
let array_b = lin_array_set(array_b, 4, 0);
This call invalidates array b so the lin array set function has the only valid copy
and then catches the array when it is returned and reassigns it to array b.
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void set_irq (int n); // Post: Interrupt request level=n
void f1 (); // Pre: level<=5, Post: level=5
void f2 (); // Pre: level=3, Post: level=3
set_irq(3); // Set the irq to 3
f1(); // Change the irq to 5
f2(); // Could deadlock if level!=3
Figure 6: A set of C function calls that depend on the interrupt request level.
The last function causes deadlock if it is called with the wrong interrupt level.
type IrqLevel[int N];
IrqLevel[N] set_irq [int N; 0<=N](Int[N] n);
IrqLevel[5] f1 [int N; 0<=N && N<=5](IrqLevel[N] irq);
IrqLevel[3] f2 (IrqLevel[3] irq);
IrqLevel[3] irq = set_irq(3); // Set the irq to 3
irq2 = f1(irq); // Use the irq
f2(irq); // Could still deadlock
Figure 7: A set of Clay function calls that depend on the interrupt request level.
The last function could still cause deadlock if it is called with the wrong interrupt
level even though the invariants have been moved from the comments to the code.
It is a common mistake to call functions that depend on a system parameter
that does not have the expected value. If there are many references to the system
parameter, aliasing errors can occur. Figure 6 shows such an example in C.
Two functions that depend on the system interrupt request (IRQ) level are called.
The IRQ numbers represent the current priority of the system IRQ level. A higher
number means a higher priority. The first function changes the IRQ but the program-
mer does not remember to test for it and calls the second function which required the
old, lower, IRQ value. This situation could lead to deadlock because an unexpectedly
high IRQ value might prevent interrupts and traps from being handled when they
should be. The f2 function may rely on interrupts that need an IRQ level of 3.
Figure 7 shows the same example, in Clay (not C) with the pre and post condi-
tions included in the code as invariants using singleton types and arithmetic com-
parisons. A value of type IrqLevel is passed to and from functions as evidence that
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@type IrqLevel[int N]; // @ means IrqLevel is linear
IrqLevel[N] set_irq [int N, int R] (IrqLevel[R] irq, Int[N] n);
IrqLevel[5] f1 [int N; 0<= N && N<=5](IrqLevel[N] irq);
IrqLevel[3] f2 (IrqLevel[3] irq);
IrqLevel[3] irq2 = set_irq(irq, 3); // Invalidates irq.
irq3 = f1(irq2); // Invalidates irq2.
f2(irq2); // Fails since irq2 is invalid
Figure 8: A set of function calls that depend on the linear interrupt request
level. The last function call will fail to type check because it takes an invalidated
IrqLevel.
IrqLevel[3] irq2 = set_irq(irq, 3);
IrqLevel[5] irq3 = f1(irq2);
IrqLevel[3] irq4 = set_irq(irq3);
IrqLevel[3] irq5 = f2(irq4); // Correct!
Figure 9: A set of function calls that depend on the linear interrupt request level.
The function headers are shown in Figure 8. This code uses the linear correctly
and succeeds.
the run-time IRQ level is equal to N whenever the function is called.
The set irq function takes a singleton integer of value N and returns an IrqLevel[N ].
The f1 function now takes an IrqLevel[intN ]. The arithmetic comparisons enforce
the invariant 0 ≤ N ≤ 5. The function returns an IrqLevel[5]. The f2 function
now takes an IrqLevel[3]. The type system will ensure that calls to f2 pass in an
IrqLevel[3]. When the code in Figure 7 is compiled, the type of irq is IrqLevel[3].
This irq is passed to f1 which calls set irq to change the system parameter to 5 and
returns an IrqLevel[5]. At this point an error is still made because irq no longer
represents the system parameter but is passed to f2. This error still sneaks by so
stronger measures are necessary.
The type system uses singleton types and arithmetic comparisons to enforce
invariants and uses linear types to avoid aliasing problems with the irq level. To
prevent passing around outdated values, variables of type IrqLevel will need to be









Figure 10: The Clay compiler
linear types added. Calls to set irq take a linear IrqLevel and invalidate it. They
return a new IrqLevel that accurately reflects the system parameter. Calls to f1 do
the same. Calls to f2 return the original IrqLevel to be re-used since it is unchanged.
Because irq2 is linear, the call to f1 invalidates it and the error seen in the previous
aliasing examples will be caught by the type checker that reports that f2 has been
handed an invalid IrqLevel. Figure 9 shows a corrected version of the function calls.
Making variables of type IrqLevel linear prevents aliasing errors such as passing an
outdated version of the irq to a function.
Singleton and linear types allow compile-time detection of aliasing errors and
invariant failures. Where missing run-time checks are necessary, invariants will fail
at compile-time alerting the programmer to the omission.
2.3 The Type-Safe Language Clay
Clay1 is a type-safe variant of C++ with an advanced type system. This language was
developed at Dartmouth College primarily by Chris Hawblitzel, Gary Morris, Eric
Krupski, and Ed Wei. The language currently supports singleton types, linear types,
polymorphism, and type inference. Clay is able to detect many errors including buffer
overflows, kernel stack overflows, NULL pointer uses, freed memory uses, and aliasing
errors at compile time. I have made small additions to the Clay compiler as needed.
These additions include bitwise operators (<<, >>, &, |, ...) and hexadecimal
numbers.
1C w/ LineAr tYpes, C w/ Linear ArithmetYc, CLassy AcronYm
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Currently many necessary safety checks in operating systems are done at run
time or not at all. Clay moves the burden of error checking from run time to compile
time thereby allowing the programmer to find errors while compiling and lessening
the number of errors the end user sees.
The Clay compiler consists of a lexer, parser, syntax checker, type checker, the
Omega constraint checker [23], and a compiler to C. Figure 10 shows a diagram of
the compilation steps. The type checker produces constraints, which are run through
the Omega constraint checker. After type checking is successful, the code compiles
to C. When a Clay file foo.clay is compiled (“clay foo.clay”), it produces a file named
foo.cc that contains the C++ translations of foo.clay and all the extern declarations
it needs.
2.3.1 Size 0 Types
The first aliasing example (Figure 6) attempted to use the interrupt request level
without passing an explicit value around. In solving the aliasing problem, an explicit
irq value of type IrqLevel had to be passed. The compiler guaranteed that the code
passed the irq value safely and only called irq functions when allowed as stated in the
invariants. The compiled code comes with this guarantee and does not need the irq
value any more since all the checks on it were done at compile time and the checks
were removed from the compiled code.
Most types take up space in memory and their values can have run-time affects.
The IrqLevel type doesn’t affect anything at run time and nothing else depends on
it at run time. It doesn’t need to take up any space in memory or even exist at run
time.
Clay types can be grouped by the amount of space they use in memory. An int in
C++ uses 32 bits of memory, a short uses 16 and a char uses 8. In Clay, these types
belong to higher groups called kinds, which reflect their linearity and the amount
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of memory they use. The type int has kind type32. This is the most common kind
and is abbreviated to type. The type IrqLevel can have the kind type0 meaning it
uses no space in memory. It is linear so the full kind would be @type0. By making
IrqLevel linear and size 0, the compiler can check all the constraints on the interrupt
request level and no longer need the IrqLevel at run-time.
Size 0 types allow invariants to be tracked throughout code without taking up
memory or slowing down the code at run time. The resulting compiled code is safe
(provably free of aliasing errors and provably matching the specification) and can be
just as fast as the original code.
2.3.2 Type Erasure
The type parameters and comparisons used during compile time are unimportant
during run-time when the compiled code has already been proven safe. After type
checking, the Clay compiler erases the type parameters and comparisons before pro-
ducing C++ code. When IrqLevel is linear and size 0, the irq functions from the
previous example change from this:
@type0 IrqLevel[int N];
IrqLevel[N] set_irq [int N, int R] (IrqLevel[R] irq, Int[N] n);
IrqLevel[5] f1 [int N; 0<= N && N<=5](IrqLevel[N] irq);
IrqLevel[3] f2 (IrqLevel[3] irq);
to this:
void set_irq (unsigned long n);
void f1 ();
void f2 ();
The resulting code has the safety guarantees from the compiler and is in C++,
a language commonly used for operating systems. This means that parts of an
operating system can be written in Clay and compiled to C++ and then compiled
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together with the rest of an operating system. Function calls are possible from Clay
to C++ and vice versa. Creating a safe operating system is a daunting task but with
Clay, important parts can be written safely and other parts can left in C or C++.
2.3.3 Clay Syntax
Clay syntax is similar to C. This section explains the differences needed to read the
code examples in the rest of the thesis.
Variable declarations
Variables must be initialized when they are declared. Unlike C, Clay has some type
inference and can guess the correct type from the initial value. The type can also be
stated explicitly. The following are declarations:
int x = 3;
let x = 3;
The first creates a signed 32 bit integer with value 3. The second asks Clay to infer
the type of x. Clay chooses Int[3], a 32 bit singleton integer.
Function headers
Unlike C, Clay function headers can include type parameters and comparisons be-
tween those parameters. The format of a standard Clay function is:
inline return_type name [type parameters; comparisons]
(parameters) limit;
As in C, the inline tag is optional. The return type can be any Clay type. Clay is
capable of returning more than one value at a time using the tuple type (φ[τ1, τ2, . . .]).
The φ in the type must be @ (linear) if any of the types in the tuple are linear. The
function name must begin with a lowercase letter. The type parameters used in
the function parameters must be declared in the square brackets along with any
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boolean comparisons between them. The swap function shown in Figure 2 shows
type parameters and comparisons:
void swap
[int M, type T, int J, int K; 0<=J && 0<=K && J<M && K<M]
(Array[M,T] array, Int[J] j, Int[K] k)
{ ... }
Types and type parameters (other than type int) must begin with an uppercase
letter. The type variables in the array get, array set, and swap functions don’t
need to have different names. As with parameter names, scope allows different
functions to use the same type parameter names. The names in swap are different
in these examples for purposes of simplicity.
The limit is optional and only appears when the function manipulates only size
0 types. If the whole function has no actual run-time effect, it and any calls to it
can be erased. The keyword for a limit is limited[N ] where N is a positive integer.
A limited function can only call functions with an equal or lower limit value. An
unlimited function acts as if its limit was infinity. This allows the compiler to erase
functions with no direct run-time effect.
Functions used in Clay but written in C++ have two syntax choices. The first:
native return_type function_name [type parameters; comparisons]
(parameters) limit;
uses the native tag and is just the function header. (native implies that the function
is written in a native non type-safe language such as C++.) If the function can be
erased, it is limited[N ] and there is no corresponding C++ function. For example,
a function which throws away the IrqLevel state-type value when it hits 0
native void pitch_irq(IrqLevel[0] irq) limited[0];
will be completely erased by the compiler.
The second syntax option for native functions is
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return_type function_name [type parameters; comparisons]
(parameters) limit = native { ...}
The C++ function header and body can be declared inside the native brackets.
Type parameters
Type parameters are declared with a kind. They can use the kinds for types as well
as int and some abbreviations that include some comparison information about the
int. A integer type parameter could be used as follows:
void foo [int N] (Int[N] n);
Each type parameter is declared with its kind. The comparisons between type pa-
rameters are phrased as a boolean expression where the possible boolean operators
are comparative (<, >, ≤, ≥, ==), additive (+,−), and logical (&&,||). The follow-
ing shows several boolean operators being used in the arithmetic comparison:
void foo [int N, int M; (N+3>M || M==10) && N>=0](Int[N] n, Int[M] m);
Clay uses some abbreviations for frequently used combinations of type parameters
and comparisons. For example, kind s32 means a signed 32-bit integer and u32
indicates an unsigned 32-bit integer. The compiler can handle differing sizes of kind
abbreviations. If a function takes a singleton integer whose value can be 0 to 3, the
kind of its type parameter can be declared as u2 to indicate it is unsigned and the
data occupies two bits:
void foo [u2 N] (Int[N] n);
This is the same as:
void foo [int N; 0<=N && N<4] (Int[N] n);
Type declarations
Types are declared in two ways:
type Int[int N] = native
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typedef TwiceInt[int N] = Int[N+N]
The first type is the singleton integer. It is declared to have kind type meaning it
is non-linear and takes up 32 bits of memory. The keyword native means the type
is defined in C by the Clay compiler. Because Int[N ] has kind type, it will become
an unsigned int when compiled so the programmer does not need to create a type
in C. The second type is built on top of an existing type and Clay can infer its kind
from the kind of Int[N ]. The kinds and some base types are built into clay. Using
a type declaration, a programmer can create new types.
Existential types
Clay uses existential type parameters when the kind of the type parameter is known
but its value is not. A function that gets external data (from a device or a user)
may not know the exact value it returns. Such a function might look like:
exists [u8 B] Int[B] query_user_for_a_char [u16 A] (Int[A] a);
This function takes a singleton integer in the range of 0 to 65535 (16 bits) and returns
some singleton integer in the range of 0 to 255 (8 bits). The type exists [u8 B] Int[B]
allows the exact value to be determined at run time.
Packing and unpacking types
When the query user for a char function is called, the returned value is existential
and will need to be unpacked [16] before it can be used as a singleton integer. This
is accomplished with square brackets after the let in its assignment statement:
let[] c = query_user_for_a_char(200);
Type int is defined as an abbreviation for exists [s32 I] Int[I] so an int can be
converted to a singleton integer by unpacking:
int x = 3; // x : exists [s32 I] Int[I]
let[] y = x; // y : Int[I] where I’s value isn’t known
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By unpacking, the type system can use the value as a singleton integer but it is not
able to recognize that the value is 3. Types can also be packed as other types to add
an existential:
let x = 3; // x : Int[3]
let y = pack [int] (x); // y : exists [s32 I] Int[I]
Again, the specific value 3 is lost when packing occurs.
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3 A Formal Abstract Machine with Concurrency
and Locks
The formalization of locks and concurrency begins with part of an abstract language
presented by Dartmouth’s language theory group in a technical report [12]. It pro-
vides the syntax and rules for an abstract machine which includes linear memory.
Operating systems are multi-threaded so I added concurrency to the abstract ma-
chine. I also added a formal lock system to allow safe threads to share data safely.
We had already proven the basic abstract machine to be sound in [12] so I re-proved
soundness on my abstract machine with concurrency and locks. Soundness means
that programs or expressions written in the abstract syntax can always evaluate
until they reach an approved end-state and types are proved during the evaluation.
This means that using my abstract machine, a multi-threaded expression that uses
locks cannot get stuck in a non-end state and cannot suddenly convert the locks into
some other type. Such an expression is forced to use the lock rules to acquire and
release the lock and may not access a locked resource without first acquiring it. My
abstract machine also prevents the release of a lock without holding a matching re-
source. This section presents the basic abstract machine and its proofs of soundness.
It then shows my addition of concurrency and locks and explains the new soundness
proofs.
3.1 The Basic Abstract Syntax
The syntax of the abstract machine is composed of linearity, environments, kinds,
types, expressions, and values.
linearity
φ = non | lin
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Linearity is represented by φ, which can be non (non-linear) or lin (linear).
arithmetic
i = · · · | − 2 | − 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | · · ·
b = true | false
The types and expressions use some abbreviations. i represents the integers,





Types are categorized into different kinds by their linearity and memory usage.
The syntax includes two kinds:
φ
i and int. The first kind is for types which take up
space in memory. The i is an integer denoting how many words of memory the types






0 correspond to Clay’s kinds type, @type, and @type0. The second kind,
int, is the kind of type parameters (e.g. in the singleton integer Int[N ], N has kind
int while the singleton integer has kind
non
1 ). As type parameters, kind ints don’t




−→ τ2 | φ〈
−→τ 〉 | I | ∀α : K.τ | ∃α : K.τ | Int(I) | Mem(I, τ) | bool
I = α | i
The types listed above are (in order) a function type which takes a type and
returns another type (the function can be linear meaning called only once), a tuple
of other types (the tuple can be linear), a type variable, an integer, a universal type,
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an existential type, a singleton integer type, a memory state type, a lock type, and
a boolean type. The singleton integer type and the memory state type are used
together to provide linearly accessed memory. The remaining types are necessary
for a sufficiently flexible abstract syntax.
expressions
e = i | b | x | e1 e2 | eτ | φ〈
−→e 〉 | λx : τ
φ
−→ e
| Λα : K.v | let 〈−→x 〉 = e1 in e2 | if e1 then e2 else e3
| pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 | unpack α, x = e1 in e2
| fix x : τ.v | load(eptr, eMem) | store(eptr, eMem, ev) | fact
The expressions are the legal statements in the abstract syntax. They include
(in order) integers, booleans, variables, application of one expression to another,
application of an expression to a type, a tuple of other expressions (the tuple can be
linear), a function abstraction which replaces a variable inside an expression, a type
abstraction which replaces a type inside an expression, a let expression, which assigns
a variable to one expression and substitutes that variable in another expression, an
if−then−else expression, an expression to pack an expression of one type as another
type, and expression to unpack a type in an expression, an expression for recursive
functions (fixed-point combinator [22]), load and store expressions for linear memory,
and a fact which is a value of memory state-type.
values
v = i | b | Λα : K.v | pack[τ1, v] as∃α : K.τ2 | λx : τ
φ
−→ e | φ〈−→v 〉 | fact
Some of the expressions are in an end-state, unable to progress to other expres-
sions. These are the values. Expressions such as load progress to other expressions
22
and are therefore not in an end-state (load progresses to the loaded value).
environments
M = {1 7→ v1, · · · , n 7→ vn}
Ψ = {1 7→ τ1, · · · , n 7→ τn}
∆ = {α1 7→ K1, · · · , αn 7→ Kn}
Γ = {x1 7→ τ1 · · · , xn 7→ τn}
C = Ψ; ∆; Γ
The environments are the memory environment (M), the type environment (Ψ),
the kind environment (∆), and the the variable environment (Γ). M maps memory
locations to values. Ψ maps memory locations to types and shows the type of each
value in M . ∆ maps type variables to kinds and Γ maps variables to types. Some
of the variables in Γ may be linear. Ψ, ∆, and Γ are usually used together and
are collectively called C, the context. These environments allow the rules of this




C is the context C without any linear types.
• C∅ = ∅; ∅; ∅, the empty context.
• C1, C2 is the union of C1 and C2.
3.2 The Basic Abstract Rules
The abstract rules relate kinds to types, types to expressions, and allow expressions
to progress to other expressions until an end-state is reached.
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kinding rules
(K IV AR) ∆ ` i : int
(K BOOL) ∆ ` bool :
non
1
(K TV AR) ∆, α : K ` α : K
(K ALL)
∆, α : K ` τ :
φ
i




∆, α : K ` τ :
φ
i




∆ ` τ1 :
φ1









∀j.(∆ ` τj :
non
ij )








∀j.(∆ ` τj :
φj
ij)








∆ ` I : int




∆ ` I : int ∆ ` τ :
non
1
∆ ` Mem(I, τ) :
lin
0
The kinding or type well-formedness rules show the kind for each type. Rules in
the form of a fraction state that the top part implies the bottom part. Statements in
the form A : B : C means that value A has type B and kind C. Part of this syntax
is seen in the kinding rules to pair a type with a kind.
For example, as seen in the rule (K INT ), when type I has kind int given the
mapping of variables to types, that mapping also holds for type Int(I), a singleton
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integer, which has kind non-linear size 1. This kind means the singleton integer takes
up the space for an integer in memory. Rule (K MEM) shows that when type I
has kind int and type τ has kind non-linear size 1 given the mapping of variables
to types, type Mem(I, τ) has kind linear size 0 using the same mapping. This kind
uses no space in memory.
These two rules show the kinds for singleton integer types and memory state
types. The singleton integer types are used to point to memory locations and need
to take 1 word of memory. The memory state-types are used to track the type
currently residing at a memory location and control linear access to it.
typing rules
(T M)
Ψ = Ψspare, Ψe Ψe; ∆; Γ ` e : τ
∀i ∈ dom(Ψ).(C∅ ` M(i) : Ψ(i)))
Ψ; ∆; Γ ` (M, e : τ)
(T V AR)
non
C , x : τ ` x : τ
(T BOOL)
non
C ` b : bool
(T FACT )
non
C , I 7→ τ ` fact : Mem(I, τ)
(T INT )
non
C ` i : Int(i)
(T LOAD)
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, τ)
C1, C2 ` load(eptr, eMem) :lin 〈τ, Mem(I, τ)〉
(T STORE)
C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, τ1) C3 ` ev : τ2
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C1, C2, C3 ` τ2 :
non
1
C1, C2, C3 ` store(eptr, eMem, ev) : Mem(I, τ2)
(T TABS)
C, α : K ` v : τ
C ` Λα : K.v : ∀α : K.τ
(T TAPP )
C ` e : ∀α : K.τ1 C ` τ2 : K





C , C1, · · · , Cn
∀i.(Ci ` ei : τi) C ` φ〈
−→τ 〉 : K
C ` φ〈−→e 〉 : φ〈−→τ 〉
(T ABS)








Γ` λx : τ1
φ




C1, C2 = Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ
C1 ` e1 : τa
φ
−→ τb C2 ` e2 : τa
C1, C2 ` e1e2 : τb
(T LET )
Ca ` ea : 〈
−→τ 〉 Cb,
−−→x : τ ` eb : τb
Ca, Cb ` let〈
−→x 〉 = ea in eb : τb
(T FIX)
C ` τ :
φ
i C, x : τ ` v : τ
C ` (fix x : τ.v) : τ
(T PACK)
C ` τ1 : K C ` ∃α : K.τ2 :
φ
i
C ` e : [α 7→ τ1]τ2
C ` pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 : ∃α : K.τ2
(T UNPACK)
C1 ` e1 : ∃α : K.τ1
C2, α : K, x : τ1 ` e2 : τ2
C1, C2 ` unpack α, x = e1 in e2 : τ2
(T IF )
Ca ` e1 : bool Cb ` e2 : τ Cb ` e3 : τ
Ca, Cb ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : τ
The typing rules show the type for each expression. As mentioned above, another
part of A : B : C is seen here to indicate that a value has a particular type (A :
B). The first typing rule (T M) states that given environments for an expression
e of type τ (Ψe; ∆; Γ) and the rest of the environments for M (Ψspare), if for every
memory location i in M , the mapping M(i) has type Ψ(i), then the expression e is
correctly typed in the full environment. (As a note: TABS is an abbreviation for
type abstraction and TAPP is an abbreviation for type application.)
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The typing rules for integers, facts, load, and store form the next piece of the
linear memory puzzle. The expression i has type Int(i) in a context stripped of
linear values. Typing rule (T FACT ) states that when the context is separated into
linear and non-linear sections, where memory location I maps to τ in the linear type
environment the expression fact has type Mem(I, τ).
non
C is the context C will all
the linear values removed.
The rules for load and store are slightly more complex. The (T LOAD) rules
says that when the pointer has type Int(I) in one environment and the matching
Mem has type Mem(I, τ) in another environment, the load expression has type
lin 〈τ, Mem(I, τ)〉 in a combined environment. This means the expression eventually
evaluates to (returns) a tuple type of the stored value type and the Mem. The Mem
has to be returned because it is linear and future loads and stores will need the
Mem. The combined environment has the mappings of both separate environments.
Environment combining is defined to make contradictory mappings (two mappings of
the same integer to different types or values) impossible. The rule for store is similar
to load and has three environments to combine. The type of a store expression is
Mem(I, τ). This means store takes a pointer, a Mem, and a value to store and
eventually evaluates to type Mem(I, τ2) where value : τ2. These rules ensure that
the given Mem matches the pointer to the linear memory and that memory cannot
be accessed without its Mem.
evaluation rules
The evaluation rules determine how an expression progresses to a new expression.
The memory environment, M , has been omitted from rules that do not affect it.
(E LOAD) (R, M, load(i, fact)) → (RM, lin 〈M(i), fact〉)
(E STORE) (R, M, store(i, fact, v)) → (R, [i 7→ v]M, fact)
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(E ABSAPP ) (λx : τ
φ
−→ e1)v2 → [x 7→ v2]e1
(E TABSTAPP ) (Λα : K.v)τ → [α 7→ τ ]v
(E LET ) let 〈x1, · · · , xn〉 = φ〈v1, · · · , vn〉 in e → [x1 7→ v1, · · · , xn 7→ vn]e
(E IF1) if true then e1 else e2 → e1
(E IF2) if false then e1 else e2 → e2
(E UNPACK) unpack α, x = (pack[τ1, v1] as τ2)in e2 → [α 7→ τ1, x 7→ v1]e2
(E FIX) fix x : τ.v → [x 7→ fix x : τ.v]v
e → e′
(M, e) → (M, e′)
The evaluation rules apply to expressions when the sub-expressions inside them
have become values. The (E LOAD) rule takes a singleton integer pointer to mem-
ory and a fact and evaluates to a linear tuple of the value in memory and the fact.
The typing rules (T LOAD), (T INT ), and (T FACT ) ensure that the singleton
integer matches the fact and the expression evaluates to a value of the type men-
tioned in the fact and an identical fact. The kinding rules (K INT ) and (K MEM)
ensure that the singleton integer is still usable and the the previous fact became
unusable and was replaced by the new fact.
The (E STORE) rule functions similarly to the (E LOAD) rule but changes the
mapping of memory location i from its old value to the new value. The expression
evaluates to a new fact whose type contains the type of the newly stored value. The
final evaluation rules states that if an expression evaluates to a new expression, its
environment evaluates with it. This rule is used for those evaluation rules which do
not affect M .
Since load and store are the only expressions which access the memory environ-
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ment mapping, all memory accesses are linear and use Mems. (Note: ABSAPP is an
abbreviation for an expression abstraction applied to an expression and TABSTAPP
is an abbreviation for a type abstraction applied to a type).
congruence evaluation rules
E[e] = eτ | pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 | unpack α, x = e in e2
| ee2 | v1e | φ〈ei, · · · , ek−1, e, ek+1, · · · , en〉 | let 〈
−→x 〉 = e in e2
| if e then e2 else e3 | load(e, eMem) | load(vptr, e)
| store(e, eMem, ev) | store(vptr, e, ev) | store(vptr, vMem, e)
(congruence rule)
(M, e) → (M ′, e′)
(M, E[e]) → (M ′, E[e′])
The congruence rules determine the order in which parts of an expression can
evaluate. E[e] is an expression containing a sub-expression e. The rule states that
the e part of the expression must evaluate first if it is not already a value. By
writing the congruence rules in this format, they don’t have to each be written out
separately. The congruence rule states that if a sub-expression and its environment
evaluate to a new sub-expression and environment, the outer expression evaluates
as well. This allows the parts of an expression to progress until they are all values,
at which point the whole expression evaluates. The congruence rule for tuples has
been changed to make tuple evaluation order non-deterministic
erasure rules
The Erasure rules apply after type checking is complete and strip out the extraneous
types from each expression. Expressions of kind size 0 such as e : Mem(I, τ) have no
direct run-time affect and take up no space assuming that they do not contain infinite
loops. While infinite loops are not generally desirable, they can be considered safe
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for the purposes of this research if they do not violate memory. After an expression
e is erased, it is referred to by d.
(ER Me) erase((M, e)) = ( erase(M), erase(e))
(ER M) erase(M) = {1 7→ erase(v1), · · · , n 7→ erase(vn)}
(ER i) erase(i) = i
(ER b) erase(b) = b
(ER x) erase(x) = x
(ER APP ) erase(e1 e2) = erase(e1) erase(e2)
(ER APPT ) erase(e τ) = erase(e)
(ER TUPLE) erase(φ〈e1, . . . , en〉) = 〈 erase(e1), . . . , erase(en)〉
(ER FUN) λx : τ
φ
−→ e = λx −→ erase(e)
(ER TFUN) erase(Λα : K.v) = erase(v)
(ER LET ) erase(let 〈−→x 〉 = e1 in e2) = let 〈
−→x 〉 = erase(e1) in erase(e2)
(ER IF ) erase(if e1 then e2 else e3) = if erase(e1) then erase(e2) else erase(e3)
(ER PACK) erase(pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2) = erase(e)
(ER UNPACK) erase(unpack α, x = e1 in e2) = let x = erase(e1) in erase(e2)
(ER FIX) erase(fix x : t :
φ
i .v) = fix x. erase(v) where i > 0
(ER FIX0) erase(fix x : t :
φ
0 .v) = 〈〉
(ER FACT ) erase(fact) = 〈〉
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(ER LOAD) erase(load(eptr, eMem)) = load( erase(eptr), erase(eMem))
(ER STORE) erase(store(eptr, eMem, ev)) = store( erase(eptr), erase(eMem), erase(ev))
Size 0 sub-expressions erase to 〈〉 when they become values. An erased program (a
big expression) will have the same intended run-time behavior as the typed program.
This allows a compiler (such as for Clay) to safely compile to an unsafe language
(such as C) after type checking is complete.
untyped expressions
d = i | b | x | d1 d2 | 〈
−→
d 〉 | λx −→ d | let 〈−→x 〉 = d1 in d2
| if d1 then d2 else d3 | fix x.u | load(dptr, dMem) | store(dptr, dMem, dv)
untyped values
u = i | b | λx −→ d | 〈−→u 〉
After type erasure, the remaining expressions and values use space in memory or
have an actual run-time affect. The load and store expressions will only be legal here
if the original typed expressions were legal so linear memory is still enforced. The
symbol for expressions has changed from e to d and from v to u, a step backwards
indicating that the types have been removed.
untyped evaluation rules
(D LOAD) (L, load(i, 〈〉)) → (L, 〈L(i), 〈〉〉)
(D STORE) (L, store(i, 〈〉, u)) → ([i 7→ u]L, 〈〉)
(D ABSAPP ) (λx −→ d1)u2 → [x 7→ u2]d1
(D FIX) fix x.u → [x 7→ fix x.u]u
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Several evaluation rules cannot apply to the untyped expressions. The above
untyped evaluation rules work where the previous rules have the wrong number of
arguments. The other untyped evaluation rules have the same format as the original
evaluation rules and simply require a name change from (E RULE) to (D RULE)
so they have been omitted.
untyped environments
L = {1 7→ u1, · · · , n 7→ un}
The environments handling types do not exist after type erasure. This leaves the
memory environment which maps memory locations to values. This environment
now handles untyped expressions and values and following the re-naming trend, its
name is changed from M to L.
A simple typed expression in this abstract syntax might look like:
(M, load(500,store(500, fact, 3)))
This expression stores the value 3 into memory location 500 and then loads it. It
progresses as follows (with types shown for clarity):
(M, load(500,store(500:Int[500], fact:Mem[500,I], 3:Int[3])))
([500->3]M, load(500:Int[500], fact:Mem[500,3])) By (E_STORE)
([500->3]M, lin<3,fact>:<Int[3],Mem[500,3]>) By (E_LOAD)
The same expression would appear as follows after type erasure:
(L, load(500,store(500,<>,3))
and would progress as follows:
(L, load(500,store(500,<>,3))
([500->3]L, load(500,<>)) By (D_STORE)
([500->3]L, <3,<>>) By (D_LOAD)
In an operating system stack memory can be viewed as a linear array of words.
The abstract machine allows safe access to a linear memory stack. The typing and
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indicates a step
(M,e:t) (M’,e’:t) ... (M’’,v:t)
Figure 11: Preservation: Types are preserved as an expressions steps.
(M,e:t) (M’,e’:t) (M,e:t) = (M’’,v:t)or
Figure 12: Progress: Non-values will step.
kinding rules enforce the linearity. Hawblitzel et al. [12] use Mem to build lists,
arrays, and regions of nonlinear data that must be accessed linearly.
3.3 Soundness Proofs
[14] presents the soundness proofs for the basic abstract machine. Soundness means
that well-typed programs will never get stuck and will follow the same specification
as the program progresses. A soundness proof consists of a proof of type preservation
and a proof of progress. Progress says that an expression which obeys the language
specification will make progress until it becomes a value. Preservation says that the
new expressions created when the initial expression progresses to a value also obey
the specification. The report also shows a proof of erasure that shows that the size
0 types can be erased without changing the run-time behavior.
Formally stated, the theorems are as follows:
Preservation: If Ψe; ∆; Γ ` e : τ , Ψspare, Ψe; ∆; Γ ` (M, e : τ) and (M, e) →
(M ′, e′), then Ψ′e; ∆; Γ ` e
′ : τ and Ψspare, Ψ
′
e;
∆; Γ ` (M ′, e′ : τ). If (M, e) is well-typed and (M, e) progresses in one step to some
(M ′, e′) then e′ has the same type as e. This means that the type of an expression is








Figure 13: Erasure1: If an expression steps to another expression, there is a







+ indicates one or more steps
Figure 14: Erasure2: If the erased expression is a value, then the typed expression
evaluates in zero or more steps to a value which erased to the original erased
expression.
Progress: If (M, e) is closed and well-typed (CMe ` (M, e : τ) for some τ and
CMe = ΨMe; ∅; ∅), then either e is a value or else there is some (M
′, e′) so that
(M, e) → (M ′, e′). This proof shows that well-typed expressions cannot get stuck





Figure 15: Erasure3: Each step taken by an untyped expression is equivalent





7→ (M2, e2) means (M1, e1) progresses in zero or one steps to (, M2, e2).
• (M1, e1)
∗
7→ (M2, e2) means (M1, e1) progresses in zero or more steps to (R2, M2, e2).
• (M1, e1)
+
7→ (M2, e2) means (M1, e1) progresses in one or more steps to (M2, e2).
• (M1, e1)
?,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (M2, e2) means (M1, e1) progresses to (M2, e2) by ap-
plying the given evaluation rule zero or one times.
• (M1, e1)
∗,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (M2, e2) and (M1, e1)
+,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (M2, e2) are de-
fined in the same way as the above definition.
Erasure: If (M, e) is closed and well-typed (CMe ` (M, e : τ) for some τ and
CMe = ΨMe; ∅; ∅), then the following holds:
1. If (M, e) → (M ′, e′) then erase((M, e))
?
→ erase((M ′, e′)). If (M, e) evaluates
in one step to (M ′, e′), then erase((M, e)) evaluates in zero or one steps to
erase((M ′, e′)). This proof shows that the intended run-time affect is not lost
during erasure. The erased expression will follow a parallel progression to that
of the typed expression. Figure 13 shows a graphic example of this erasure
sub-theorem.
2. If erase(e) is a value then (M, e)
∗
→ (M ′, v), erase((M, e)) = erase((M ′, v)). If
the erasure of e is a value then (M, e) evaluates in zero or more steps to some
(M ′, v′) where the erasure of (M, e) equals the erasure of (M ′, v′). This proof
states that only extraneous types are erased from the values. The steps that
took (M, e) to (M ′, v) must have handled only extraneous types. Figure 14
shows a graphic example of this erasure sub-theorem.
3. If erase((M, e)) → (L′, d′) then (M, e)
+
→ (M ′, e′), erase((M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′). If
erase((M, e)) evaluates in one step to (L′, d′) then (M, e) evaluates in one or
more steps to (M ′, e′), and erase((M ′, e′))= (L′, d′). This proof states that a
step taken by an erased (M, e) is equivalent to one or more steps taken by the
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unerased (M, e). One of the steps had an actual run-time affect. The others
handled only extraneous types. Figure 15 shows a graphic example of this
erasure sub-theorem.
3.4 Adding Concurrency to the Abstract Machine
The basic abstract machine does not contain any notion of multiple processes or
threads. A single thread is basically a big expression. A tuple of expressions can
simulate a machine running several threads.
〈thread1, thread2, thread3〉
In the basic abstract machine these threads would evaluate one at a time and not
interact because there is no means of passing data between them.
A simple non-deterministic process manager is implemented in the congruence
rule for tuples. This rule allows any non-value sub-expression in a tuple to evaluate
next so the overall evaluation order is non-deterministic. The congruence rule for
tuples is non-deterministic and evaluation of the tuple causes some thread to take
a step so all threads will eventually progress by taking interleaved steps in a non-
deterministic fashion. This allows formal concurrency in my abstract syntax.
The following shows a simple example of several threads using the concurrent
abstract syntax:
〈store(500, fact, 3), store(504, fact, 4), store(508, fact, 5)〉
Each thread stores an integer into a memory location. A valid progression of steps
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for this multi-thread program could be
〈store(500, fact, 3), store(504, fact, 4), store(508, fact, 5)〉
〈fact, store(504, fact, 4), store(508, fact, 5)〉
〈fact, store(504, fact, 4), fact〉
〈fact, fact, fact〉
or any other combination of three threads which each take one step.
A series of let expressions can force deterministic behavior in a tuple when needed.
let x = e1 in let y = e2 in let z = e3 in 〈x, y, z〉
This let expression forces the sub-expressions in the tuple to evaluate in order. There-
fore, the change which allows non-deterministic evaluation order does not prohibit
any previous functionality.
3.5 Adding Locks to the Abstract Machine
In a typical operating system, access to data structures and devices may be shared by
several threads. The abstract machine with concurrency does not have a way to share
data safely. I added syntax and rules to my abstract machine to implement shared
data. This section discusses some basic locking issues and shows abstract machine
additions which will prevent locking errors that cause memory safety violations.
State types can control access to data structures and devices in operating system.
To share this access, a state type can be locked to allow only one thread to access
the device or data at a time. Untyped locks are vulnerable to many safety violations.
A safely typed lock needs to take these vulnerabilities into account.
In general, a lock is associated with a bit of memory. When the bit value is 0,
the lock is free and any thread may claim it, changing the value to 1. When the bit
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acquire(lock); acquire(lock); acquire(lock);
// critical section // critical section // critical section
release(lock); release(lock); release(lock);
Figure 16: Correct access to the same critical section by 3 threads.
acquire(lock); acquire(lock2);
// critical section // critical section // critical section
release(lock); release(lock2);
Figure 17: Three attempts to access the critical section by acquiring its lock. The
first code section is correct while the second and third code sections incorrectly
acquire the lock.
value is 1, the lock is already held by a thread and the other threads must try again
later or wait. If the lock is implemented so that those wanting the lock wait until it
is free, the lock is called “blocking”. When the thread holding the lock releases it,
the bit value is reset to 0.
Typically each lock is associated with a critical section or set of critical sections.
In Figure 16, three threads acquire a lock, access the critical section, and release
the lock. If the threads are all running concurrently then the order in which they
acquire the lock is non-deterministic.
3.5.1 Problems with Locks
Forget to acquire
Standardly, locks in C (the Posix libraries) do not enforce the matching of a particular
lock with a critical section. They also do not force the thread to acquire any lock at
all when accessing the critical section. This allows the following to occur.
The first code section in Figure 17 correctly acquires the lock for the critical
section. The second code section forgets to acquire any lock and doesn’t prevent
simultaneous access by the first code section. This could cause inconsistent data.
For example, if both critical sections read some shared memory and then write to it,
the second section to read might see the original value or the value just set by the
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acquire(lock); acquire(lock); acquire(lock);
// critical section // critical section // critical section
release(lock); release(lock2);
Figure 18: Three attempts to release the critical section’s lock. The first code




Figure 19: A re-entrant lock.
first section. The third code section acquires the wrong lock and not only doesn’t
prevent simultaneous access by the first code section but it ties up the lock2 for no
reason.
Forget to release
The first code section in Figure 18 correctly acquires the lock for the critical section.
The second code section forgets to release the lock and could cause deadlock if any
further code sections attempt to acquire the lock. The third code section forgets to
release lock1 and releases lock2 instead. Forgetting lock1 could cause deadlock as in
the second code section. If some other code section was still holding lock2, then this
could cause inconsistent data when another code section acquires lock2.
Re-entrant locks
A re-entrant lock as seen in Figure 19, occurs when a thread tries to acquire a lock
it already holds. The thread running this code section will wait forever because
it cannot acquire the lock until it releases it. This can cause deadlock if the lock
system is unprepared for such errors. This type of error can easily occur in large





Figure 20: Releasing an unheld lock.
Release unheld locks
If a thread releases a lock it does not hold, as seen in Figure 20, it could cause some
other thread to lose its hold on the lock causing inconsistent data.
The above-mentioned locking errors can cause data inconsistencies and deadlock
in code vital to the running of an operating system. Deadlock is technically safe as
long as memory is not violated but data inconsistencies are a patent safety violation.
A multi-threaded safe operating system kernel would therefore need support for safe
locks.
3.5.2 Safer Locks
In order to add support for locks, the following types, expressions, values, and envi-
ronments were added to the abstract machine:
types
τ+ = Lock(I, τ2)
The type Lock(I, τ) means that a lock exists for a value of type τ and the lock bit
is located at memory location I.
values
v+ = lock
The value lock is the lock itself and has type Lock(I, τ).
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expressions
e+ = create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) | acquire(eLock, eptr)
| release(eLock, eptr, eresource) | lock
The create lock, acquire, and release expressions allow for creation, acquiring,
and release of a lock.
environments
R = {1 7→ 〈−→v1〉, · · · , n 7→ 〈
−→vn〉}
Θ = {1 7→ 〈−→τ1 〉, · · · , n 7→ 〈
−→τn〉}
The new resource environment, R, and its type Θ track the lock controlled re-
sources and their linear lock bit pointers. R contains the set of lock bit Mem values
and the currently free resources. Θ contains the lock bit Mem type and the resource
type even when the lock is held and resource is not in the R environment.
The evaluation, type well-formedness, type checking, and erasure rules needed to
enforce the lock abstractions are as follows:
evaluation rules
(E CREATELOCK) (R, M, create lock(i, fact, vresource))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, M, lock)
(E ACQUIRE1) (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [i 7→ 1]M, vresource)
where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(i) = 0
(E ACQUIRE2) (R, M, acquire(lock, i)) → (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1
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(E RELEASE1) (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, [i 7→ 0]M, 〈〉)
where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1
(E RELEASE2) (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource))
→ ((R, M, release(lock, i, vresource)))
where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(i) = 0
The congruence rules that would let each of these expressions progress one non-
value parameter at a time are of the same format at those mentioned above and
allow the parameters to evaluate from left to right until all parameters are values.
The create lock expression evaluates to a lock when its parameters are a pointer
describing the location of the lock bit (I), the fact for the lock bit, and the resource
state-type value to be locked. The fact for the lock bit is not returned so that only
the lock can change the value of this bit. The fact and the resource are both stored
in the R environment under R(I) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and their types are stored in the
Θ environment under Θ(I) = 〈Mem(I, τ), τ〉.
The acquire expression evaluates to itself when its parameters are values but
M(I) = 1 meaning the lock is already held. Thus, the expression blocks until the lock
is freed. When M(I) = 0 and the parameters are the lock and the pointer to its lock
bit, the expression evaluates to the resource state-type value. The resource state-type
value, being linear, is removed from the R environment though its type is still stored
in the Θ environment. The value of the lock bit changes to 1 indicating the lock is
now held so M(I) = 1, R(I) = 〈fact〉, Ψ(I) = Int(1), and Θ(I) = 〈Mem(I, τ), τ〉.
The release expression evaluates to itself when its parameters are values but
M(I) = 0 meaning the lock was already free. When M(I) = 1 and the parameters
are a lock, a pointer to the lock bit (I), and the locked resource state-type value,
the resource is once again stored in the R environment and the lock bit value is
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changed to 0 indicating that the lock is free so M(I) = 0, R(I) = 〈fact, vresource〉,
Ψ(I) = Int(0), and Θ(I) = 〈Mem(I, τ), τ〉. A discussion of why the “releasing a free
lock” expression blocks is shown in Section 3.5.5.
kinding rules
(K LOCK)
∆ ` I : int ∆ ` τ :
lin
0
∆ ` Lock(I, τ) :
non
0
The kinding rule (K LOCK) specifies that type Lock is non-linear and takes no
space in memory. The Lock depends on a singleton integer type which is non-linear
and some type which is linear size 0. The singleton integer type refers to the memory
location of the lock bit and the other type refers to the linear size 0 resource to be
locked. The non-linearity allows the values of type Lock to be duplicated and passed
around in operating system code so that any thread which might need to acquire the
lock has a copy of it.
valid lock states
(T FREE) Int(0); 〈τMem, τresource〉 ` 〈τMem, τresource〉
(T HELD) Int(1); 〈τMem, τresource〉 ` 〈τMem〉
The two valid lock states are held and free. When a lock is free, the Ψ environment
maps its lock pointer to Int(0) and the Θ environment maps its lock pointer to
〈τMem, τresource〉. In this case, the resource is stored in the Θ environment. When a
lock is held, the Ψ environment maps its lock pointer to Int(1) and the Θ environment
maps its lock pointer to 〈τMem〉. Here, the resource is being used and thus not stored




Ψ = Ψspare, Ψe, ΨR1, · · · , ΨRn Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` e : τ
∀i ∈ dom(Ψ).(∅; Θ; ∅; ∅ ` M(i) : Ψ(i))
∀i ∈ dom(Θ).(ΨRi; Θ; ∅; ∅ ` R(i) : τi and Ψ(i); Θ(i) ` τi)
Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ ` (R, M, e : τ)
(T LOCK) ∅; Θ, I 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(J)), τ2〉; ∆;
non
Γ ` lock : Lock(I, τ2)
(T CREATELOCK)
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, Int(0))
C3 ` eresource : τ :
lin
0
C1, C2, C3 ` create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) : Lock(I, τ)
(T ACQUIRE)
C ` eLock : Lock(I, τ) eptr : Int(I)
C ` acquire(eLock, eptr) : τ
(T RELEASE)
C1 ` eLock : Lock(I, τ) eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eresource : τ
C1, C2 ` release(eLock, eptr, eresource) :non 〈〉
(T LOCK) specifies that the lock type matches the contents of the Θ environ-
ment. Additionally, the value of the lock bit must be 0 meaning the lock starts out
unheld. (T CREATELOCK) ensures that the pointer to the lock bit matches the
fact for the lock bit. It also ensures that the returned lock matches the resource
type and the lock bit location. (T RELEASE) ensures that the lock matches the
pointer and the resource.
erasure rules
(ER RMe) erase((R, M, e)) = ( erase(M), erase(e))
(ER LOCK) erase(lock) = 〈〉
(ER CREATELOCK) erase(create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource))
= create lock( erase(eptr), erase(eMem), erase(eresource))
(ER ACQUIRE) erase(acquire(eLock, eptr)) = acquire( erase(eLock), erase(eptr))
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(ER RELEASE) erase(release(eLock, eptr, eresource))
= release( erase(eLock), erase(eptr), erase(eresource))
The erasure rules remove the lock and the resource state-type value but keep
the pointer to the lock bit. Expressions that were legal under the evaluation, type
well-formedness and type checking rules will still have the same safety properties
after erasure. Therefore the untyped locks will still be handled safely.
untyped evaluation rules
(D CREATELOCK) (L, create lock(i, 〈〉, 〈〉)) → (L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 0
(D ACQUIRE1) (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) → ([i 7→ 1]L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 0
(D ACQUIRE2) (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) → (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) where L(i) = 1
(D RELEASE1) (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) → ([i 7→ 0]L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 1
(D RELEASE2) (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) → (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) where L(i) = 0
Untyped evaluation rules are necessary for each of the create lock, acquire, and
release evaluation rules because the Mem, the Lock, and the size 0 resource have
been erased to 〈〉 to create the untyped expressions.
3.5.3 Example of Locks in the Abstract Machine
The following example of locks in the abstract machine creates a lock for a fact
which guards memory location 500. The lock is acquired so 50 can be stored in the
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guarded location and then the lock is released:
(λx :lin 〈Mem(500, τlock), Mem(504, τresource)〉
non
−→
let 〈xlock, xresource〉 = x in
let y = create lock(500, xlock, xresource) in
release(y, 500, store(504, acquire(y, 500), 50)))
(lin 〈fact, fact〉)
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This example evaluates using the rules in the abstract machine.
(R, [500 7→ 0]M, (λx :lin 〈Mem(500, τlock), Mem(504, τresource)〉
non
−→
let 〈xlock, xresource〉 = x in
let y = create lock(500, xlock, xresource) in




(R, [500 7→ 0]M, let 〈xlock, xresource〉 =lin 〈fact, fact〉 in
let y = create lock(500, xlock, xresource) in
release(y, 500, store(504, acquire(y, 500), 50)))
(E LET )
→
(R, [500 7→ 0]M, let y = create lock(500, fact, fact) in
release(y, 500, store(504, acquire(y, 500), 50)))
(E CREATELOCK)
→ )
([500 7→ 〈fact, fact〉]R, [500 7→ 0]M, let y = lock in
release(y, 500, store(504, acquire(y, 500), 50)))
(E LET )
→
([500 7→ 〈fact, fact〉]R, [500 7→ 0]M,
release(lock, 500, store(504, acquire(lock, 500), 50)))
(E ACQUIRE1)
→
([500 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [500 7→ 1]M, release(lock, 500, store(504, fact, 50)))
(E STORE)
→
([500 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [500 7→ 1, 504 7→ 50]M, release(lock, 500, fact))
(E RELEASE1)
→
([500 7→ 〈fact, fact〉]R, [500 7→ 0, 504 7→ 50]M, 〈〉)
The first step evaluates the function abstraction and sets x equal to the pair of
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facts. The second step separates x into its component facts. This step evaluates
the top level let expression and substitutes facts for xlock and xresource. The third
step evaluates the create lock subexpression to a lock. The fourth step evaluates the
remaining let expression and substitutes the lock into the remaining inner expression.
The fifth step evaluates the acquire expression to the resource, a fact. The sixth
step evaluates the store expression using that fact and stores the value 50 into the
guarded memory location. This step returns the fact which is released back into R
on the seventh step. As the lock is acquired and released, the M and R environments
are updated. This example showed the safe usage of a lock in the abstract machine.
3.5.4 Prevented Lock Problems
The additional abstract syntax and rules prevent many of the aforementioned lock
problems.
When access to the actual resource requires the vresource, the lock must be acquired
before the resource can be accessed. This access must be controlled by enforcement
functions such as load and store, which require the correct fact before a word of
memory can be accessed. Therefore the resource cannot be used if no lock or the
wrong lock is acquired. When the lock is released, the vresource is handed back to the
lock and the old copy is invalid (because it is linear) so the vresource can no longer be
passed to access functions for the resource.
The “forget to release” error causes deadlock and is not solved by the abstract
machine. A programming language such as Clay, which implements the abstract
machine could notice when a function ends abandoning a linear variable and produce
an error message at compile time. The error is, however, not a memory safety
violation.
The “re-entrant locks” problem can also cause deadlock and is not solved by
the abstract machine. As with the “forget to release” error, it could be solved by
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implementing lock numbering in Clay. Lock numbering can be used to tell when
a lock is doubly acquired. A wrapper around the lock functions which implements
lock numbering would solve this problem.
To release a lock, a valid vresource must be handed to the release expression. Since
the vresource is only valid when the lock is held, it cannot be released when it is already
free. If a duplicate resource is created and handed to the release function, it will
block until the lock is acquired.
Together, lock, create lock, acquire, and release allow creation of a nonlinear
lock on a linear resource. Copies of the lock may be passed around but only one lock
copy may access the resource at a time. A locked resource cannot be accessed by
acquiring the wrong lock or no lock at all. An unheld lock is not able to be released.
This means that locks in my abstract syntax cannot cause memory safety violations
by improperly locking shared data. Standardly, locks implemented with acquire and
release functions, instead of a lock clause, can be risky if a lock is released in the
middle of a conditional expression [3]. However, an expression which uses a lock after
it is released will not type check in my abstract machine. Therefore, the machine
can safely use the more powerful acquire and release implementation.
3.5.5 Lock Discussion
One lock for multiple copies of a resource
The abstract machine allows a given lock to control only one copy of a resource even
though an operating system may have several copies of a resource to place under one
lock. This section discusses an alternate lock specification to the one presented in
the abstract syntax.
A basic lock controlling one copy of a resource is also known as a bit semaphore.
The lock bit needs 1 bit to encode on and off. An integer semaphore which encodes
numbers controls multiple identical copies of a resource thus allowing code to increase
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the semaphore by releasing resources into the lock and decrease the semaphore by
acquiring resources from the lock. When the lock integer is 0, the acquire function
blocks until some other code releases a resource into the lock.
lock = createlock(lock_int, lock_mem); // empty! no resources yet.
release(lock_int, lock, resource1); // now it has a resource
release(lock_int, lock, resource2); // 2 resources checked in
release(lock_int, lock, resource3); // 3 resources checked in
resource = acquire(lock_int, lock); // back to 2 resources
In the abstract syntax, unheld resources can be stored in R, the resource en-
vironment. In the multi-resource implementation, releasing an unheld lock adds a
resource to the lock instead of causing an error.
Acquire blocks until a copy of the resource is available and then decrements
the lock integer. The test and decrement operation needs to be atomic to prevent
overlapping acquire calls which decrement the lock below 0. Release increments the
lock integer. There is no upper limit on the number of unheld resources allowed in
this implementation.
The memory and resource environments for a lock integer i currently guarding 3
unheld resources:
M [i] = 3
R[i] = 〈fact, resource, resource, resource〉
Θ[i] = 〈Mem[I, Int(3)], tresource〉
The memory environment M is unchanged. The resource environment R contains
a tuple of the lock integer fact and all the unheld resources. The resource type
environment is unchanged because all the resource copies have the same type.
If desired, a maximum number of checked-in resources could be set. In this case,
the release function blocks if the maximum number of resources is already checked
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in.
My abstract machine uses one lock per resource because the device driver did
not required any multi-resource locks.
One lock for one copy of a multi-copy resource
The (E RELEASE1) evaluation rule in the abstract syntax tests M(i) and R(i) to
make sure the lock is held before releasing it. Without that test, (E RELEASE1)
will release any same typed resource with the lock for that type. If the lock is meant
to manage only one copy of the resource and falsely assumes only one copy exists, it
could release the wrong copy. For example, in Clay’s syntax:
@type0 Foo[type T ] = exists [intI] Mem[I, T ]
Foo[T ] is a linear size 0 state type which takes a type parameter T with kind type
and tracks a location of this T in memory. There can be easily several values of type
Foo[T ] in existence at one time for a given T (T could be the singleton integer 3).
If there are two values of type Foo[T ]; resource one and resource two:
lock = create lock(lock bit, lock bit Mem, resource one);
resource one = acquire(lock, lock bit);
release(lock, lock bit, resource two);
release(lock, lock bit, resource one);
The first call to release passes in the wrong resource but succeeds. The second call
would cause havoc as resource two is over-written or resource one is lost or the lock
bit fails to increment. Normally this problem cannot exist because only one copy of
a resource with that exact type exists. A previously released resource is invalid so
it can’t be re-released. In this case, there are multiple instances of the same typed
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resource.
There are several ways to handle this problem:
1. Release blocks if the lock is already unheld. This could be useful for process
communication. In a system with two communicating threads, if thread2 needs
to know that thread1 has begun a task, it can release an unheld lock. When
thread1 acquires the lock, it immediately releases leaving thread1 with a re-
source copy and leaving thread2 with the knowledge that thread1 has started
the task. Thread2 can then acquire the lock, retrieving its copy of the resource,
and both threads can continue.
2. Acquire returns both the resource and a special tag. If release takes a resource
and the tag then different threads could not release each others held locks. This
still means the wrong resource could be released by the thread holding the lock
but a release would show up as an error as the tag would be invalidated on the
first release.
3. The release expression takes the lock, the resource, a success expression, and a
failure expression. This would require a more complicated typing rule for the
release expression
The simplest of these choices was the first. Since there are reasons to pick all
three choices, the simplest won out. A lock which blocks indefinitely on release
causes deadlock, which is unwanted but safe behavior. This choice does not violate
the progress property because it allows a release expression to continually progress
to itself. The decision was largely arbitrary as all three options were viable.
3.6 Soundness Proofs with Concurrency and Locks
The Soundness proofs for the abstract syntax with the addition of locks are shown
in Appendix A. The addition of the R and Θ environments changed the proof
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statements as follows:
Preservation: If Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` e : τ , Ψspare, Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` (R, M, e : τ) and
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′), then Ψ′e; Θ
′; ∆; Γ ` e′ : τ and Ψspare, Ψ
′
e; Θ
′; ∆; Γ ` (R′, M ′, e′ :
τ).
Progress: If (R, M, e) is closed and well-typed (C ` (R, M, e : τ) for some τ and
C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅), then either e is a value or else there is some (R′, M ′, e′) so that
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′).
Erasure: If (R, M, e) is closed and well-typed (C ` (R, M, e : τ) for some τ and
C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅) then the following holds:
1. If (R, M, e) 7→ (R′, M ′, e′) then erase((R, M, e))
?
7→ erase((R′, M ′, e′)).
2. If erase((R, M, e)) 7→ (L′, d′), then (R, M, e)
+
7→ (R′, M ′, e′)
and erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′).
3. If erase(e) is a value, then erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′) and erase((R, M, e)) =
erase((R, M, v)).
The major change from the original soundness proofs discussed in Section 2.3
is the addition of locks and the resource environment (R and its type environment
Θ). The resource environment is only affected by operations on locks. The new
soundness proofs are shown in Appendix A.
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4 Device Driver Abstractions
Since the study done by Chou et al. [4] found that drivers are the source of most
operating system bugs, a safe Ethernet adapter is a starting point for a safe OS
kernel. Ethernet adapters rely on interrupts, FIFO queues, and system state. The
safety abstractions of a driver can be guaranteed using state and configuration types.
Ethernet adapters pass packets between a machine and its Ethernet cable. The
packets are held in two FIFO queues: one to hold packets before they are transmitted
onto the network, and one to hold packets as they are received from the network.
Depending on whether the adapter uses direct memory access or programmed IO
(PIO), the FIFO queues may be located in kernel memory or on the device itself.
Adapters also have registers to hold status information. The adapter communicates
with the operating system through a driver.
This section explains the safety abstractions of a programmed IO Ethernet adapter
and then shows the formal types I use to guarantee the abstractions. Given some
basic starting assumptions (e.g. the driver is passed the correct data structure)
an Ethernet driver that implements the abstractions is not able to violate memory
safety or perform unsafe IO operations on the adapter. Section 5 describes my im-
plementation of the locks of the abstract machine and the formal types needed by an
adapter to make sure my 3Com Etherlink III 3c509 Ethernet driver implementation
handles the safety invariants of both the shared data structures and the adapter.
4.0.1 The 3c509 EtherLink III NIC adapter
The 3c509 network card is an example of an Ethernet adapter that uses programmed
IO. The FIFO queues are located on the adapter. The processor sends and receives
from the FIFOs a word at a time. The driver must take care not to overflow the
transmit FIFO by pushing more words than will fit or underflow the receive FIFO
































Figure 21: 3c509 window 0 registers [5]
scribes the abstractions a 3c509 driver is expected to support. These abstractions
are assembled into a collection of invariants and rules on the interaction between the
the 3c509 adapter and the operating system.
Accessing the Adapter
The 3c509 adapter is accessed through IO reads and writes to its registers which
are separated into seven 8-word windows. Each window contains a related group of
registers. One register can be accessed in any window. Writes to this register are
commands issued to the adapter. Reads access the status of the adapter. The other
registers require the adapter to be their specific windows. Each register has a set of
invariants it expects are true when it is accessed. For example, some registers can
only be read not written and others require statistics to be turned off, etc. A safe
3c509 adapter needs to guarantee the set of access invariants for each register.
Window 0 registers
Window 0 is used to initialize the adapter. Adapter interrupts are disabled when
window 0 is the current register window. This window contains the EEPROM
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Figure 22: 3c509 window 1 registers [5]
fault IO address and available cable connections. Only the EEPROM can be ac-
cessed before the adapter is initialized. The other registers in this window mirror
the EEPROM configurations and can only be accessed after initialization. Each of
these register is 16 bits in length. The registers for product and manufacturing ID
can only be read. All of the other window 0 registers can be written as well as read.
Window 1 registers
Window 1 is the standard operating window. The registers in this window include
transmitter and receiver status, free bytes in the transmitter FIFO queue rounded
down to a double word, and the PIO data registers which read from and write to
the FIFO queues. The transmitter status register and PIO data registers may be
read or written. The other registers in this window may only be read. As seen in
Figure 22, only 8 bits can be read from the TX status or timer registers.
The PIO register IO operations can transmit and receive one byte, one word or
two words at a time. The packet must be padded to a double word before transmit-
ting or receiving. Any buffers on the operating system side need extra space for this
padding.
The RX status register contains the length of the head received packet in the
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RX FIFO. It is unsafe to read more than this length from the RX FIFO. The length
shown in the RX status register in incremented as packet bytes are received and
does not reflect how much of the packet has been read by the driver. For safety, the
driver should check packet status after the whole packet has been received and the
adapter status register shows an RX complete interrupt. Then the driver needs to
read the packet and issue an RX discard command to go to the next RX packet’s
status.
It is unsafe to write to the TX status register unless the TX complete interrupt
is triggered. Other writes risk making packet status inconsistent. The free transmit
bytes register takes an extra IO cycle to update after packet transmission is com-
pleted. A safe driver will make some other IO operation between transmitting a
packet and reading the free transmit bytes register.
Window 2 registers
Window 2 holds the station address. It must be read from the EEPROM and written
here before the receiver is enabled.
Window 3 registers
Window 3 manages the transmit and receive FIFO queues. The actual number of
free bytes in each queue is available here. As with free transmit bytes, free receive
bytes should not be used to calculate RX packet length because of the overhead
involved.
Window 4 registers
Window 4 contains diagnostic registers and the available controller types (coax,
twisted pair, or a combination).
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Window 5 registers
Window 5 contains current masks and thresholds. These registers are set through
commands and do not need to be accessed.
Window 6 registers
Window 6 holds the statistics registers. Statistics must be disabled before these are
read.
The command register
The command register accepts 16 bit IO writes. Bits 11-15 of a command are the
command itself. Bits 0-10 hold arguments to the command or 0 if there are no
arguments. If a command takes longer than one I/O cycle to complete, the driver
must poll the adapter status register for a non-busy signal before continuing with
further IO operations. Each command is listed below with a short explanation and
its list of calling invariants.
Global Reset Resets the adapter and clears the FIFO queues. Requires a 1ms
delay where no other IO operations are allowed.
Select Window Selects the window given as the argument. Windows 0-7 are legal
even though there is no window 7.
Start Coax Turns on the coax transceiver. This command requires an 800us delay.
RX Disable Disables packet receiving.
RX Enable Enables packet receiving.
RX Reset Disables the receiver and empties the receiving FIFO queue.
RX Discard Discards the head packet in the receiving FIFO queue and its status.
This command makes the adapter busy for an indeterminate length of time and
the driver must poll the status register for a non-busy signal before proceeding.
58
TX Enable Enables the transmitter.
TX Disable Disables the transmitter.
TX Reset Disables the transmitter, empties TX FIFO queue, resets the available
TX space, and restarts the transmitter.
Request Interrupt Requests the adapter to set an interrupt.
Acknowledge Interrupt Acknowledges and clears specific interrupt triggers. The
possible interrupts are:
• Interrupt Latch - The actual interrupt.
• Adapter Failure - This occurs with any errors not shown by other interrupt
triggers. The adapter will not proceed until a global reset command is
issued. This interrupt is triggered by safety violations but is not, itself,
unsafe.
• TX Complete - Packet transmission has completed.
• TX Available - There is room in the TX FIFO for a requested number of
packet bytes.
• RX Complete - A packet has been completely received.
• RX Early - The first part of a packet has arrived.
• Interrupt Requested - An interrupt was requested.
• Update Statistics - The statistics are full.
Set Interrupt Mask Chooses which interrupt triggers to allow. The masked trig-
gers can still be read but won’t generate an interrupt on their own.
Set Read Zero Mask Masks interrupt triggers so that their status register bit is
always a 0.
Set RX Filter Sets the receiving filter to individual, multicast, broadcast, or all.
Set RX Early Threshold Sets the amount of a packet that should be received
before a RX early interrupt is generated. The threshold can be any multiple of
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4 between 0 and 1792. If the threshold is greater than 1792, RX early is disabled.
The adapter truncates arguments to a 2-word multiple. If the threshold is set
to less than 60, there may be packet collisions. Therefore, any threshold value
greater that or equal to 60 and less than or equal to 1792 is safe.
Set TX Available Threshold Sets the number of free bytes in the TX FIFO
queue needed to transmit. The threshold can be any multiple of 4 between
0 and 2,044. If the threshold is greater than 1792, TX available is disabled.
Set TX Start Threshold Sets the number bytes in TX FIFO queue before the
packet starts to transmit. The threshold can be a multiple of 4 from 0 to
1792. The adapter truncates arguments to a 2-word multiple. If the threshold
is greater than 1792, early transmission is disabled and the packet transmits
when all of it has reached the TX FIFO queue. Therefore, any threshold value
less than or equal to 1792 is safe.
Statistics Enable Enables statistics.
Statistics Disable Disables statistics. Statistics must be disabled before reading
them. The adapter still collects statistics while they are disabled; leaving them
disabled for very long will cause some statistics to be incorrectly updated.
Stop Coax Stops the coax transceiver. This command requires a 800us delay.
These commands affect several adapter states. Global Reset, Start Coax, and
Stop Coax require a known waiting period before further commands can be issued.
The Select Window command changes the current register window. Statistics Enable
and Disable enable or disable statistics. RX Reset, TX Reset, Global Reset, and RX
Discard affect the amount of free space in the FIFO queues. RX Discard makes
the adapter busy for an unspecified amount of time and requires polling the status
register for a non-busy signal before any further IO operations may occur. The




The 16 bit status register allows the driver to access several adapter state conditions.
This is the only register that can be safely accessed when the adapter is busy. The
status bits include the interrupts, the bit which signals if the adapter is busy, and
bits for the current window.
The Packet Receiver
When an RX Complete interrupt is triggered, a full packet is waiting in the receive
FIFO. Its length and any errors are shown by the RX status register in window 1.
If there were errors the driver must issue an RX Discard command. Otherwise, the
length needs to be padded up to a double word before the packet is read from the
RX PIO data register. After receiving the packet, an RX Discard command needs
to be issued to remove the packet from the receive FIFO and update the RX status
register.
The Packet Transmitter
Packet transmission requires three steps. First a packet information word is written
to the TX PIO data register. The word contains the actual packet length, whether
an interrupt is wanted after complete transmission, and the CRC which determines
who pads the packet (driver or adapter). The CRC bit is usually 0 so the adapter
does any necessary padding. In the second step, a word equal to 0 is written to
the TX PIO data register. In the third step, the packet is written to the TX PIO
data register a double word at a time. The packet must still be rounded up to a




The driver consists of setup, start, transmit, receive, stop, statistics, and multicast
functions. The receive function is interrupt driven. The driver shares a device data
structure with the operating system. I added a lock bit to the end of this data
structure. Each function called by the operating system acquires the lock on the
data structure before proceeding.
The setup function locates an inactivated 3c509 adapter if there is one and acti-
vates it. Setup uses contention select to pick an adapter if more than one 3c509 is
present. The setup function allocates space for a device data structure if the oper-
ating system has not already allocated space for it. It then actives the adapter and
initializes it with the base IO address and the interrupt request line. Setup initial-
izes the fields of the device data structure and puts pointers to the start, transmit,
stop, statistics and multicast functions into the structure. This function leaves the
adapter in window 1, the normal operating window.
The start function takes the adapter from activated to enabled. It first resets
transmitter and receiver FIFO queues. This clears the queues and their status and
free space registers. The start function then calls an interrupt setup function with
the irq and a pointer to the interrupt handling function. It sends an activation IO call
to the adapter in case it has been de-activated and then starts the coax transceiver
or twisted pair. After that it clear all of the adapter statistics and enables them. It
enables the transmitter and receiver and finally resets the wanted interrupt triggers
and clears any leftover interrupts. At this point, the adapter is ready to be used.
When a incoming packet has completely reached the adapter, it generates an
interrupt which is passed to the driver’s interrupt function. The interrupt function
determines if the interrupt heralds a received packet or an error and either calls the
receive function or updates a statistics data structure.
The receive function reads in packets from the receive FIFO on the adapter. It
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checks the length of the head packet in the RX FIFO queue. If the RX Status
register indicates that the packet was received correctly, the receive function creates
a buffer to hold the packet and reads it into the buffer 2 words at a time from the RX
PIO data register. When the packet is read, an RX discard command is issued to
the adapter. This removes the head packet form the RX FIFO and update the RX
Status register to reflect the status of the next packet. The receive function handles
packets until the queue is empty of completed packets. Incorrectly received packets
are discarded.
The stop function disables the adapter without deactivating it. It turns off
adapter statistics, disables the transmitter and receiver, turns off the coax or twisted
pair transceiver and removes the irq from the operating system’s collection of inter-
rupts. After the stop function is called, the adapter is not usable until the start
function is called again.
The multicast function allows the operating system to update the type of packets
it wants to receive without disabling the adapter. The operating system chooses
a combination of direct, multicast, broadcast and promiscuous modes. Multicast
implies broadcast and promiscuous implies all three other modes.
The statistics function updates a statistics data structure and returns a pointer to
it. To do this, it disables adapter statistics, changes to window 6, reads all statistics
and updates the data structure, and then re-enables adapter statistics and changes
back to window 1.
The driver also includes various support functions. These include a transmitter
timeout function, a statistics updating function and EEPROM reading functions.
The timeout function is called by the transmit function if the adapter has not had
room in its TX FIFO for a new packet for too long. Timeout clears the interrupts
and resets the transmitter. This discards all packets waiting in the TX FIFO and re-
starts the transmitter. The statistics update function reads each adapter statistic and
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updates the relevant OS statistic in the statistics data structure. It disables adapter
statistics before reading them and enables them again afterwords. The EEPROM
functions allow the driver to read the EEPROM before and after activation. Both
send the desired EEPROM data location to the EEPROM command register, wait a
required amount of time, and then read the data from the EEPROM data register.
4.1 Operations on a PIO Ethernet Adapter
An Ethernet adapter supports a limited set of operations which allow it to initialize,
send and receive packets, generate interrupts, track adapter/queue status, and collect
statistics. An Ethernet adapter is accessed through IO operations on its registers
which are separated into different windows. The FIFO queues for a PIO adapter
are located on the device and are also accessed through IO operations. A type-safe
Ethernet driver has a safe interface for each operation.
The initialization operations only access the set of IO addresses the device might
listen on. When the adapter is initialized, a base IO address is picked and all future
IO operations use that base address. The operations can be grouped into a few
categories based on their safety requirements.
The first category of IO operations are oprtaions on the FIFO queues. Operations
on the send and receive FIFO queues are only done when the adapter is in an
initialized and ready state. The read and write operations access data in allowed
increments and the overall amount of data accessed is padded to a specified boundary.
The driver only reads data that is actually in the receive queue. During the read
operation, the adapter is in the correct window for the receive FIFO and isn’t busy.
This data is read into a waiting buffer that is large enough to hold it. Likewise, the
driver only writes data from an existing buffer into the send queue when the amount
of data does not overflow the buffer or queue. This operation also requires a specific
window and an non-busy adapter. These are the only safe operations that can be
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done on a PIO adapter FIFO queue.
The second category of IO operations are the status operations. The data read by
status operations includes triggered interrupts, free bytes in the send queue, amount
of data available in the receive queue, and the current window. These operations read
an allowed amount from a register in the correct window. Some status operations are
allowed when the adapter is busy. (This lets the driver poll to see when the device
is no longer busy). Some status registers allow writes to update their information.
The act of writing triggers the adapter to update these status registers.
The third category of IO operations are commands to the adapter. Commands
are IO writes of a specific size (e.g. 16 bits) to one command register. Commands
might be delayed or ignored if issued while the adapter is busy so the adapter needs
to be non-busy unless it is known that delayed/dropped commands cannot cause
safety violations. Some commands cause the adapter to become busy and for safety,
the driver waits until the adapter is free again.
The final category of IO operations are the general read and write operations.
These test and set the adapter settings. These operations only take place when the
adapter is in the correct window. Some operations come in read/write pairs and
some are only a read or only a write. Each general operation accesses at most its
maximum number of allowed bytes (generally 1,2, or 4). Some operations are only
performed after adapter statistics are turned off. Like the commands, the general
operations only occur when the device is non-busy.
The operations described above are the only operations in a safe PIO Ethernet
driver. To formalize an interface for these operations, I first extend some type
concepts from Section 3 and then create types for the IO operation interfaces.
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4.2 Extending Types to Support Operations
This section focuses on extending type concepts to provide more support for OS and
device abstractions. Starting from Mem(I, τ) I create types to enforce abstractions
on collections of memory, state in an operating system, and the IO interface to
Ethernet adapters.
4.2.1 Collections of Memory
The Mem(I, τ) type is used to track the state of a memory word. A Mem(I, τ) can
therefore be called a memory state type. The concept of memory state types can be
extended to track the state of a collection of memory words.
A type for such a collection of memory words can be built from the existing
types in the abstract syntax: Pair(I, X, Y ) =lin 〈Mem(I, X), Mem(I + 1, Y )〉 :
lin
0 .
The Pair type is the memory state-type for a pair of consecutively data.
4.2.2 State Types
Operating systems keep track of a lot more state than just the type of memory words.
For example, an operating system might need to track whether interrupts are on or
off, or if the Ethernet adapter is up and running. I extended the concept of “memory
state types” to “state types” which are linear size 0 and track states throughout the
operating system. The generalized state types are still linear and size 0 so they take
up no space in memory and have no associated run time cost.
As an example, the abstract syntax for an interrupt state type could be intr :
Intr(I) :
lin
0 where I is 0 or 1 depending on whether interrupts are turned on or off. If a
single copy of intr exists in the operating system, it can be passed around and used to
track the current state of interrupts. The enforcer expressions associated with it are
those expressions which require interrupts to be on or off or which enable or disable
interrupts. As Mem enforces the abstraction of linearity on a word of memory, Intr
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enforces abstractions on the sections of OS code concerned with interrupts.
The abstractions of safe IO operations can be tracked by state types. Given the
IO operation safety criteria, the driver needs to use state types for:
• The current window
• The base IO address
• Adapter statistics status
• Adapter busy status
• TX FIFO free space
• RX FIFO used space
These six states track all of the critical information in an Ethernet adapter. Writes
to and from a buffer and the PIO TX and RX registers additionally use a buffer
state-type to ensure that the driver does not overflow or underflow an operating
system buffer.













QueueState(iAdapter, iQueue, iSpace) :
lin
0
All of these states are tied to a specific adapter in case more than one network
card is present. The IOAddressState tracks the current base IO address. The
state prevents IO operations outside the legal range of addresses. WindowState
tracks the currently used register window. The state ensures that register are only
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accessed while the adapter is in the correct window. BusyState indicates whether the
adapter is busy. Only the adapter status register is read when this state shows that
the adapter is busy. StatisticsState tracks whether adapter statistics are currently
turned on or off. This state needs to indicate off before statistics can be read from
window 6. The driver needs two values of type QueueState to track the amount of
known free space in the TX FIFO and the amount of known used space in the RX
FIFO. As long as the known amounts are conservative (there may be more actual
free space in the TX FIFO), this state prevents overflow and underflow of the queues.
Together these state track all safety concerns of the adapter.
One additional state type is needed to guarantee safety on the operating system
side. Packets in the operating system are stored in buffers. The driver needs to make
sure it does not overflow or underflow these buffers:
BufferState(iHeadAddress, iDataStart, iDataEnd, iTailAddress) :
lin
0
The BufferState type shows the current address boundaries for a buffer. This buffer
follows the convention for an SK buffer in a Linux adapter driver. HeadAddress
points the the first byte in the buffer. DataStart points to the first byte of ac-
tual data. Unneeded packet headers may fill the space between HeadAddress and
DataStart. DataEnd points to the byte after the end of the data. Similarly,
TailAddress points the the byte after the end of the buffer. Overall, iHeadAddress ≤
iDataStart ≤ iDataEnd ≤ iTailAddress. If this relationship is preserved, the buffer cannot
overflow or underflow.
4.2.3 Configuration Types
Operating system abstractions have sets of static rules which describe the allowed
relationships between state-type variables. These configuration rules describe the
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values that a set of state-type variables must have in order to perform an action,
such as sending a packet to an Ethernet adapter. I further extended the concept
of state types to configuration types which are constant. Since configuration type
variables are constant, they do not need to be linear but they are still size 0.
An IO function specification that allows an Ethernet adapter to communicate
with its driver needs to ensure that several different states are in agreement. For
example, a safe IO call to send a word of memory to a specific port on the device
might need to know the following:
1. The register is legal.
2. The register can be written.
3. The device is either not busy or it doesn’t matter.
The third need can be expressed as a state type: DeviceBusy(IDevice, IBusyState) :
lin
0 .
which expresses whether the device with identifier IDevice is busy or not. The iden-
tifier is a singleton integer unique to the device. IBusyState is 0 or 1 depending on
the state of the adapter. A type that can relate different state types is needed to
package all three safety needs together. This type specifies the different acceptable
configurations of state types and is named a configuration type.
Three basic configuration types are needed to enforce the abstractions on the base
IO address, commands written to the adapter, and general register reads and writes.
IO packet data read and write operations and status read and write operations are
possible on such a limited set of ports that it makes sense to write individual function
interfaces for these operations. The remaining IO operations use the configuration
types described below to share a smaller set of function interfaces.
IOAddressConfig(iBus, iLowAddress, iHighAddress) :
non
0
The IOAddressConfig type states the acceptable base IO address range for a
69
given bus. In the case of the ISA bus, this range is 0x200 to 0x3E0, inclusive. This





The CommandConfig type lists the constraints on writes to the command reg-
ister. The first parameter is the command itself. This allows an IO expression to
match a CommandConfig type value to a singleton integer command. The sec-
ond parameter indicates whether the command takes arguments. Arguments are bit
masks and are added to the command before it is sent to the adapter. The IO ex-
pression checks that the arguments, if any, fit into the given 11 argument bits. The
wait time indicates the time in µ seconds that the driver must wait after issuing the
command. This allows the driver to handle commands which take more than one IO
cycle to complete. An IO expression matches this parameter to a singleton integer
time. The fourth parameter indicates if the command causes adapter statistics to
turn on or off. Three values (0,1,2) could determine if it turns statistics on, off, or
has no affect on statistics. Commands which change statistics cause a statistics state
type to change. The last parameter indicates if the command may be issued while
the adapter is busy. Some commands such as RX Discard take an unknown amount
of time to complete and cause a busy state type to change.
RegisterConfig(iWindow, iBytes, iRead, iWrite, iIsRangedPort, iLowPort, iHighPort,
iStatsOnOk, iAdapterBusyOk, iChangeQueue) :
non
0
The RegisterConfig state type list the configuration of states and values neces-
sary to access a particular register. The first parameter is the window of the register.
The second parameter is the number of bytes that are allowed to be accessed at once.
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If bytes is 4, as in the case of the TX PIO data register, the register may be accessed
by the byte, word, or double word. The read and write parameters indicate which
type of access is allowed. Some registers allow both reads and writes so it was sim-
pler to encode this as two parameters. The fifth parameter indicates whether the
port actually occupies a range of registers. The station address is an example of a
ranged port. A ranged port allows one RegisterConfig to control access to the six
consecutive station address ports. The lowest and highest ports of a ranged port are
the next two parameters. If the port is not ranged, these should both be the actual
port. The stats parameter indicates whether adapter statistics may be turned on
when this register is accessed. The statistics registers require that adapter statistics
be turned off. The busy parameter indicates if the adapter is allowed to be busy.
Only the status register may be accessed when the device is busy. The last parame-
ter indicates whether accessing the register changes the free space in a FIFO queue.
For example, writes to the TX PIO data register decrease the free space in the TX
FIFO queue. Together, these parameters list all the configuration rules related to
accessing a register.
4.2.4 A Typed Function Specification
The formal interface for a PIO FIFO data read uses most of the state and configu-
ration types. Data is read in repeated accesses a few bytes at a time. The PIO data
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read operation takes care of the repetition.
(T PIO data read)
C1 ` iBaseAddress : Int(IBaseAddress)
iBufferAddress : Int(IBufferAddress) iDataSize : Int(IDataSize)
RegisterConfig(IWindow, IBytes, IRead, IWrite,
IIsRangedPort, ILowPort, IHighPort,
IStatsOnOk, IAdapterBusyNotOk, IChangeQueue)
C2 ` ebuffer state : BufferState(IHeadAddress, IDataStart, IDataEnd, ITailAddress)
C3 ` eaddress state : IOAddressState(IAdapter, IBaseAddress)
C4 ` ewindow state : WindowState(IAdapter, IWindow)
C5 ` ebusy state : BusyState(IAdapter, INotBusy)
C6 ` equeue state : QueueState(IAdapter, IRXQueue, IUsedSpace)
where IDataStart <= IBufferAddress, IBufferAddress <= ITailAddress,
IDataSize > 0, IBufferAddress + IDataSize + 3 <= IDataEnd, (3 for padding),
IUsedSpace ≥ IDataSize, IRead = 1 and IWrite = 0
C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6,` PIO data read(iBaseAddress, iBufferAddress, iDataSize,
ebuffer state, eaddress state, ewindow state, ebusy state, equeue state)




QueueState(IAdapter, IRXQueue, IUsedSpace − IDataSize)〉
This IO operation only reads an existing number of bytes from the RX FIFO
queue and places the bytes into an existing buffer that is large enough to hold them.
The interface guarantees that the window is correct and the adapter is not busy.
72
(This port is not ranged, statistics do not matter, and read does change the used
space in the RX FIFO queue.)
The various state-type values are set by IO status operations and by values in
the shared data structure of the driver. The adapter adapter status register contains
information on whether the device is currently busy and the data sturcture has a
field for the IO address. Function interfaces for the status read and IO address read
set the state types to their correct values.
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5 Implementation
I implemented locks and a safe 3Com Etherlink III 3c509 driver in Clay. The driver
depends on locks to safely access a shared data structure. Using an OS starter kit,
the OSKit[9], I implemented a small multi-threaded operating system, Shale, in C.
The driver compiles to C++ and then to an object file, which is linked with the
C code. My 3c509 driver is guaranteed to only make safe IO calls and safe buffer
reads/writes. It is able to send and receive packets. This section discusses my lock
implementation, my 3c509 driver implementation, and the small operating system.
The next section discusses benchmarking my driver.
5.1 Locks
This implementation of locks is written in Clay’s syntax and matches the abstract
syntax mentioned in Appendix A.
Locks are built from three basic types.
type Int[int I] = native
@type0 Mem[int I, int A] = native
typedef Ptr[int I, int T] = @[Int[I], Mem[I,T]]
Int[I] is a singleton integer and a pointer to memory location I. Mem is the
memory State Type which tracks a word of linear memory. Mem[I, T ] means that
memory location I contains a value of type Int[T ]. Ptr[I, T ] is a linear pair of
a pointer to linear memory and its associated Mem. The pointer cannot be used
without its Mem so it is a convenience to handle them together.
Locks come in two related types:
type0 Lock0[int Bit, @type0 Resource] = native
typedef Lock[int Bit, @type0 Resource] =
.[Lock0[Bit, Resource], Int[Bit]]
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The first type is the lock itself. This type is nonlinear and size 0 so that copies of
it can be passed around to all code sections which might need the lock; no extra
memory will be needed for it at run time. The second type is a pair of the lock and
a pointer to the lock bit. The “.” before the pair brackets ([ ]) states that the pair
is nonlinear. Since all accesses to the lock will require the lock bit, it makes sense
to bundle them together. Keeping the size 0 lock type separate allows flexibility in
declaring the location of the lock bit. The bit location could be separately declared
or could be in a chosen place in a locked data structure (e.g. the first bit). The type
checker verifies that the lock bit pointer matches the Lock0 it’s bundled with.
Two functions are used to create locks:
native Lock0[B,R] create_lock0 [@type0 R, int B]
(R resource, Mem[B,0] bit) limited[0];
Lock[B,R] create_lock [@type0 R, int B] (R resource, Ptr[B,0] bit_p)
{
let (bit_addr, bit_mem) = bit_p;
let lock0 = create_lock0(resource, bit_mem);
return .(lock0, bit_addr);
}
The first function takes the resource state type value, the lock bit pointer, and its
memory state type value and returns a Lock for the resource. The memory state
type and resource state type values are not returned, thus preventing access to the
resource until the lock is acquired. This function calls a limited native function
which takes the memory state type and resource state type values and coerces them
to a Lock0 value. The native create lock0 function is limited which means it handles
only size 0 types and has no need of a matching C function. The Lock0 value gets
bundled with the lock bit pointer and returned as the Lock. In this implementation,
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the lock bit is allocated and initialized to 0 before the create function is called. The
type checker will verify that the lock bit value is actually 0.
The function to acquire a lock is native. It takes a Lock (a pair of a Lock0 and
its lock bit pointer) and goes to C to acquire the lock:
native R acquire [int B, @type0 R] (Lock[B,R] lock);
native {
// test_and_set_bit is atomic x86 assembly btsl on bit 0
inline void acquire(unsigned long lock) {
while (test_and_set_bit(0, (void *) lock)==1);
}
}
The C acquire function uses an atomic swap operation to block until the lock bit
value is 0 and then sets it to 1 claiming the lock. The Clay function header coerces
the resource state type out of the Lock and returns it.
The release function is also native. It takes a Lock and its resource state type
value and goes to C to release the lock:
native void release [int B, @type0 R] (Lock[B,R] lock, R resource);
native {
// test_and_clear_bit is atomic x86 assembly btcl on bit 0
inline void release(unsigned long lock){
while (test_and_clear_bit(0, (void *) lock)==0);
}
}
The C release function uses an atomic swap operation to block until the lock bit
value is 1 and then sets it to 0 releasing the lock. The resource state type value is
not returned and must once again be acquired to use it.
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Locks in action
To demonstrate the Clay lock implementation, a collection of memory state types is
formed and locked. Unsafe operations on this lock are caught by the Clay compiler.
The memory to be locked is passed in as array of consecutive Mem. The array type
follows:





typedef LArray[int I, int J, @type0<-(int) F]
= LIf[I!=J,LArrayS[I,J,F]]
LArrayS is a structure containing linear size 0 data and an array of more data.
LArray is an array of linear size 0 data with the same basic type. An array of type
LArray[I, J, F ] contains linear type 0 data with the indices I through J − 1. F is a
function that maps an index to its data. LIf is a union type that contains a linear
size 0 type if a given condition is satisfied. In this case the LIf contains the next
LArrayS structure as long as there is another one in the array (I 6= J).
A stack can be represented as a linear array of Mems (assuming you want only
32-bit integers). Such a stack has the type
LArray[0, Max, fun[int I] exists[int A] Mem[Base + (4 ∗ I), A]
where the stack addresses run from base : Int[Base] to max : Int[Base + 4 ∗
(Max − 1)]. Mems can be allocated from the stack using an allocation function.
The recursive type fun needed to create an LArray is described in [14] but not
presented in the abstract machine.
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@[Ptr[Base+4*I,N], Int[Base+4*(I+1)],
LArray[I+1,J,fun[int I] exists[u32 A] Mem[Base+4*I,A]]]
alloc[u32 I, u32 J, u32 Base, u32 N, I<J]
(LArray[I,J,fun[int I] exists[u32 A] Mem[Base+4*I,A]] stack,
Int[Base+4*I] ptr, Int[N] value);
The function is not relevant to this example and calls several other Clay functions
so only its header is shown here. alloc takes a stack of linear memory, a pointer to
the next free memory location, and an initial value. The function returns a pointer
to the allocated and initialized memory (a pair of its Mem[Base + 4 ∗ I, N ] and its
address Int[Base+4 ∗ I]) as well as the updated next pointer and the, now smaller,
stack.
The collection of memory that is locked below is a consecutively stored pair of
integers that add to 100. The memory state type which tracks this pair is show here:
typedef AddedPair[int I] =
exists [s32 N, s32 M; M==100-N] @[Mem[I,N],Mem[I+4, M]]
AddedPair[I] create_addedpair [int I, s32 A, s32 B; B==100-A]




Locking an AddedPair state-type prevents access to the pair of integers it tracks.
Given a stack of linear memory and a pointer to its base:
LArray[0,200,fun[int I] exists[int A] Mem[Base+4*I,A]] stack
Int[Base] base
We can dynamically allocate some linear integers and a lock bit (also a linear integer)
from the stack and create an AddedPair:
let (x_ptr, base stack) = alloc(stack, base, 4);
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let (y_ptr, base, stack) = alloc(stack, base, 96);
let (bit_ptr, base, stack) = alloc(stack, base, 0);
let (x_addr, x_mem) = x_ptr;
let (y_addr, y_mem) = y_ptr;
let resource = create_addedpair(x_mem, y_mem);
x ptr, y ptr, and bit ptr are allocated from the linear memory stack and initialized
to the passed in values. They are all of type Ptr meaning they are a linear pair
of a pointer and its Mem. The fourth and fifth lines of code separate each Ptr
into its component address and Mem. This invalidates each original linear Ptr.
The resource is then created from the two memory state types, invalidating them.
Invalidating used linears makes the following code mistakes impossible:
let resource2 = create_addedpair(x_mem, y_mem); // error caught now
let resource2 = resource; // error caught later
The first mistake attempts to create a second AddedPair and this line fails the
type checker because x mem and y mem were invalidated upon creating the first
AddedPair. The second mistake attempts to make an alias to resource. The line
of code succeeds but it invalidates the original resource so any future attempts to
use resource with fail the type checker because resource is invalid. These caught
errors show that Clay correctly handles linear values and does not allow them to be
aliased or used after they become invalid.
The following code locks the resource, and duplicates the nonlinear lock.
let lock = create_lock(resource, bit_ptr); // linear resource invalid
let lock2 = lock; // lock is still valid
let lock3 = lock; // lock = lock2 = lock3
The create lock function reads the linear resource and the Mem component of the
bit ptr and does not return them. This invalidates the resource and the lock bit
Mem so only the lock has control over resource and only the lock can load or store
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the lock bit. If we attempted to read resource after this, the type checker would
catch it:
let [ ] (x_mem,y_mem) = resource; // read resource..fails
This mistake attempts to access the locked, but not acquired, resource. The type
checker catches it because resource has become invalid.
The next section of code acquires the lock, separates resource into its compo-
nents, and prints the values it was guarding.
let resource = acquire(lock); // linear resource valid
let [ ] (x_mem,y_mem) = resource; // linear resource invalid
let (x_mem, x_data) = load(x_addr, x_mem); // load value of x (4)
let (y_mem, y_data) = load(y_addr, y_mem); // load value of y (100-4)
print_int(x_data); // prints 4
print_int(y_data); // prints 100-4
The lock is now held so the resource can be accessed.
To release the lock, the AddedPair is re-formed and passed to the release function:
let resource = create_addedpair(x_mem, y_mem);// linear resource valid
let lock = release(lock, resource); // then invalid
The lock is now unheld and resource is invalid.
If the values of x and y no longer added to 100 or an integer in a different memory
location was substituted, the type checker will catch the error:
let y_mem = store(y_addr, y_mem,10); // y = 10 (10 != -4+100)
let resource = create_addedpair(x_mem, y_mem); // bad addition..fails
let resource = create_addedpair(x_mem, z_mem); // bad location..fails
The type checker find errors when creating this added pair. It will also catch errors
where the wrong integer is placed into the resource. The memory locations of x and
z are not consecutive so the create addedpair function fails to type check.
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Attempts to re-release the lock will also fail because resource becomes invalid on
the first call to release:
let lock = release(lock, resource); // re-release..fails
The type checker catches this re-releasing error because the linear resource is invalid.
If the lock is re-released using a different, but valid, AddedPair, the lock will block
until another thread acquires it.
Because the lock is nonlinear, copies can be made and used interchangeably even
though only one resource may ever be acquired at a time:
let resource = acquire(lock2); // uses lock 2
let lock4 = release(lock3, resource); // lock = lock2 = lock3...
Prevented lock problems
This lock implementation matches the locks in the abstract syntax. Of the four lock
problems, the abstract syntax and implementation for locks provides compile time
prevention of “forget to acquire”. Additionally, locks may not be released without
a matching resource which is a partial solution to “release unheld lock”. The “re-
entrant lock” problem could be solved through lock numbering and Clay is intended
to catch dropped linear values at the end of a function2 which would provide an
implementation solution to the “forget to release” problem.
Minimizing trips to C++
All types and functions declared to be native must be defined in C++. The C++
code is not guaranteed to be safe so minimizing trips to C++ is important.
When the Clay lock code is compiled, it produces extern statements for all non-
limited native functions. These functions must be defined in C++.
extern void acquire(unsigned long lock);
2Clay does not currently notice dropped linear values at the end of a function but this
could be added in the future.
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extern void release(unsigned long lock);
Both functions contain only 1 line of C++ code and the atomic functions they
depend on contain 1 line of assembly code. The functions are short enough that
inspection gives reasonable assurances of safety.
The following shows a compilation and run of the lock code example described
above. For testing and demonstration purposes, print lines have been included which
show the memory location of the lock bit and its value as the lock is acquired and
released.
#prompt) clay lock.clay




lock before acquire = 0




lock before release = 1
lock after release = 0
lock at 162988048
lock before acquire = 0
lock after acquire = 1
lock at 162988048
lock before release = 1
lock after release = 0
If the above were run without the C function printlines, the output would simply
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print the values of x and y in the example. 4 and 96 are the values assigned to the
pair of integers.
It would be possible to write the acquire and release functions in Clay by sub-
stituting the while loops with a special type of recursive for-loop that allows type
parameters to change as the loop cycles. The calls to the atomic assembly instruc-
tions need to remain native since there is currently no Clay equivalent to C’s assembly
calls.
Allocating different sizes of memory
The lock example showed only 32-bit integers. The Mem type and alloc function
could be easily changed to allow allocation of any memory size.
@type0 Mem1[int I, type T] = native
typedef Mem8[int I, type T] = @[Mem1[I,T], Mem1[I+1,T], Mem1[I+2,T],
Mem1[I+3,T], Mem1[I+4,T],
Mem1[I+5,T], Mem1[I+6,T], Mem1[I+7,T]]
typedef Mem16[int I, type T] = @[Mem8[I,T], Mem8[I+8,T]]
typedef Mem32[int I, type T] = @[Mem8[I,T], Mem8[I+8,T],
Mem8[I+16,T], Mem8[I+24,T]]
These memory state-types track memory by the bit, the smallest unit available. In
this implementation, Mem (Mem32) is a pair of consecutive smaller Mems. I could
also have defined it as two Mem16s or 32 Mem1s.
A separate allocation function would be needed for each size of allocation. For
example, the allocation function for unsigned 16-bit integers:
@[Ptr16[Base+I,N], Int[Base+I+16],
LArray[I+16,J,fun[int I] exists[int A] Mem1[Base+I,A]]]
alloc16 [u32 Base, u32 I, u32 J, u16 N; I+16<J]
(LArray[I,J,fun[int I] exists[int A] Mem1[Base+I,A]] stack,
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Int[Base+I] ptr, Int[N] value);
This function allocates 16 1-bit Mems and returns the Ptr to the allocated memory,
and the updated stack and next pointer.
5.2 The 3c509 Adapter
This section discusses my implementation of the 3c509 driver. I talk about imple-
mentation choices I made based on an existing 3c509 driver and the architecture in
my computer. The benchmark performance of the driver is discussed in Section 6.
5.2.1 Implementation Choices
My safe 3c509 driver is based on Donald Becker’s 3c5x9 driver version 1.18 [1].
I ported the driver to Clay using the state and configuration types designed in
Section 3. This driver handles several different 3Com network adapters and several
bus types (EISA, ISA, and MCA). The x86 architecture running Shale includes the
ISA bus and the 3c509 adapter so the safe driver only includes code for the 3c509
running on a ISA bus. Donald Becker’s implementation differs slightly from the
3Com manual [5]. Since the 3c5x9 driver is already known to work, the safe driver
mimics this driver rather than the exact steps outlined by the 3Com manual. This
allows general speed comparisons between the 3c5x9 driver and the safe driver.
5.2.2 Clay Types
This section discusses some of the types used in my driver implementation. They
are closely related to the state and configuration types mentioned in section 4. The
configuration types include configurations for command and register IO operations
as well as a configuration to set the base IO address.
type0 BaseConf [int Bus, int Low, int High] = native
type0 CmdConf [int C, int Wait, int Stats, int Busy] = native
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type0 PortConf [int Win, int Bytes, int Read, int Write,
int Port] = native
type0 RangedPortConf [int W, int B, int R, int T, int LowP,
int HighP] = native
These BaseConf type states that a given bus allows base IO addresses between Low
and High.
BaseConf[ISA_Base, 0x200, 0x3F0] isa;
My 3c509 driver uses an ISA bus and sets the base IO address using the above
configuration-type value.
Command operations come with an indication of the wait time they require and
whether they change statistics or make the adapter busy.
CmdConf[StartCoax_CMD,800,0,0,0] start_coax;
CmdConf[StatsEnable_CMD,0,StatsEnabled+1,0,0] stats_enable;
The above command configuration-types state that the start coax command needs
an 800 micro-second wait and the Statistics Enable command changes statistics to
enabled.
The configuration types for a register operation shows the necessary window, the
number of bytes to access, and the port for the register.
PortConf[1,2,1,0,RxStatus_REG] rx_status;
The RX status register is located in window 1, handles up to 2 word reads, and
doesn’t allow writes. RxStatus REG is defined to be 0x08. For ease of use, I split
the ranged port and single port configuration-type into two configuration types.
Only 2 registers actually use a range of ports and this move shortened the type
information checked at each IO interface for the other register operations.
The state types track the various states of the adapter.
@type0 BaseState [int Device, int Base] = native
@type0 BusyState [int Device, int Busy] = native
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@type0 StatsState [int Device, int Stats] = native
@type0 QState [int Device, int Queue, int Space] = native
@type0 WinState [int Device, int Win] = native
The driver uses one of each state type (and one state type for each FIFO queue).
@type0 DevStateS
[int This, int W, int B, int D, int S, int T, int R] = struct {
WinState [This, W] window;
BaseState [This, B] io_addr_base;
BusyState [This, D] busy;
StatsState [This, S] statistics;
QState [This, TX_FREE, T] tx_free;
QState [This, RX_USED, R] rx_used;
}
When the driver enters a function (e.g. transmit), it does not know the current values
of these states and must gather them before Clay will let it perform operations which
depend on them. This is accomplished through reading a stored base address and a
status register read operation. Together, they set the current window, base address,
and adapter busy state. The QStates are set as needed by TX and RX status
operations. The statistics state is set by enabling or disabling statistics.
Certain registers such as the status register require a unique IO interface so I
didn’t give them a port configuration-type and instead wrote an IO function which
only uses their port offset.
native exists [u1 B2, u16 V, u3 W2]
@[Int[V], Int[W2], Int[B2], WinState[D,W2],
BaseState[D,A], BusyState[D,B2]]
el3_inwStatus
[u32 D, u32 A, int B1, int W1]
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(Int[A] addr,
WinState[D,W1] win, BaseState[D,A] base, BusyState[D,B1] busy);
The above function header shows the interface to the status register. The only
incoming requirement is that the base address is the stored one. The status register
returns two bytes of data (Int[V ] where V is the complete status data). Among
the data bits are the current window (Int[W2], the window bits) and the busy state
of the adapter (Int[B2], the busy bit). The status function returns these and then
updates state-type values so that further IO operations are possible.
5.2.3 Prevented Violations
My implementation of the 3c509 driver prevents several categories of errors assuming
the function input invariants are not violated.
• Two driver functions will never hold the device data structure lock at once or
interleave their reads and writes to the adapter.
• The driver will never read a register in the wrong window.
• The driver will not read or write more bytes than a register allows.
• The driver will read only the adapter status register while the adapter is busy.
• The driver will not read more data from the receive FIFO than it contains.
• The driver will not overflow the buffer it places a received packet in.
• The driver will only send a packet to the adapter if there is room in the transmit
FIFO.
• The driver will not under-write or over-write its device data structure.
This list of prevented errors includes all the abstraction invariants from section 4.
In particular, the third point means that the following scenario happens safely: One
thread is in the interrupt function when another interrupt is generated. The first
thread holds the device data structure lock. The second interrupt thread will wait
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for the lock while the first proceeds. The lock mean that two interrupt threads will
not be able to process 3c509 interrupts at the same time.
Clay guarantees the specification matches the implementation. There may still
be specification bugs. If the specification is correct, a badly written driver may not
send or receive any packets but it will not be able to overrun or underrun the FIFO
queues, cause memory errors, mishandle shared data structures.
5.3 A Toy Operating System
To show the practical application of the additions to Clay’s abstract syntax described
in Section 3, I used the additions to re-write portions of a toy operating system. The
toy OS, Shale, is a kernel built using parts from the Flux OSKit [9] developed at
the University of Utah. Shale is similar to Linux although much smaller to make it
manageable for research purposes.
5.3.1 The OSKit
The Flux OSKit [9] was designed to make operating system building and interactions
on an x86 architecture much simpler. It consists of libraries written in C which handle
all of the standard tasks an operating system or interface to one might need. Using
the OSKit, the “hello world” OS requires less than 20 lines of additional code.
Several systems have been written using the OSKit including the Fluke OS and
ported versions of ML, SR, and Java [9].
• The Fluke OS was built using the OSKit and consists mostly of OSKit code,
drastically cutting down on the code that needed to be specifically written for
the OS.
• ML/OS is a version of SML/NJ ported to run on a PC. Using the OSKit, a
small team of masters and undergraduate students completed the project in a
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few months. The libraries in the OSKit took care of the x86 low level details
so that most of the time was spent understanding the details of SML.
• SR/OS is a port of SR from Unix to a more platform-neutral version. It was
accomplished by a graduate student in a matter of weeks.
• Java/PC is similar to Sun’s JavaOS but took significantly less time to build; a
few weeks of work by a graduate student.
The Flux OSKit allows operating systems to be created very quickly by providing
functions for basic OS tasks. The functions used in these tasks can be rewritten or
replaced to create a specific operating system.
5.3.2 Functionality
Shale, the toy OS, is written in C, assembly, and Clay using pieces of the OSKit.
The OS uses the memory interface, networking, interrupt, thread, and driver support
sections of the OSKit. It runs three kernel level applications: arp, ping, and a firewall.
Shale uses standard linux device drivers including the 3Com 3c509 network adapter
described in Section 4. The OS takes advantage of the OSKit’s thread support to run
multi-threaded using a round robin scheduler. All threads have the same priority.
The arp and ping applications behave like their standard Unix counterparts.
They send out data packets and report the responses they get. The operating system
can also respond to arp and ping requests sent from other machines on the internal
or external network.
The firewall separates an internal network from an external one and expects
two Ethernet connections, one to the internal network and one to the external.
In protecting the internal network, the firewall allows only specified packet types
to travel between the internal and external networks. Either network can arp or
ping the firewall and vice versa. Currently only HTTP packets are allowed to cross
between networks. A standard firewall might allow ssh and sftp but disallow telnet
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and ftp. This firewall uses IP masquerading to hide the IP address of machines
on the internal network. Packets sent through to the external network show the
firewall machine’s IP address regardless of which internal machine sent the packet.
Arp allows the firewall to support IP routing and masquerading.
The interrupt code spawns a new thread for certain interrupts including those
from the 3c509. This prevents a deadlock possibility: One thread calls the transmit
function and acquires the device data structure lock. While it is in the transmit
function, the adapter receives a packet and generates an interrupt. The interrupt
code then spawns a new thread calling the 3c509 interrupt function. The interrupt
thread needs to acquire the device data structure lock so it will block until the
transmit thread releases the lock. Interrupts are only disabled long enough to spawn
a new interrupt thread so the transmit function will be able to proceed and will not
deadlock. If the interrupt did not spawn a new thread and left the old interrupts
disabled, the process scheduler would not switch processes and the transmit thread
would never release its lock causing a deadlock situation.
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6 Measures of Success
A type-safe language for operating systems can be judged by several measures. The
first concerns how safe the language actually is. What errors can it prevent? The
second concern is how much complicated information must be added to the code
to achieve the safety. The third measure is how well code sections written in the
language work with legacy code sections and whether the legacy code can be au-
tomatically translated into the type-safe language. Does it play well with legacy
code? The fifth measure is how easy the language is to use. Does it take longer
than expected to write int eh language? Can other programmers read your code?
The fifth measure is whether the type-safe code is slower than a legacy version of
the same code. The fifth measure concerns how extensible the language is. Will the
safety features of this language be enough for other applications? I performed some
stress tests on the adapter to check its behavior under large loads and found that it
ran safely as specified in the Clay implementation.
6.1 Safety
Clay was already able to prevent aliasing errors, buffer overflows, null pointer deref-
erences and many other errors. My research prevents some lock problems and en-
ables better abstraction enforcement through special types. The abstract syntax and
matching Clay implementation of locks can prevent the “forget to acquire” errors.
Clay should be able to catch the “forget to release” problem at the end of function
calls. That leaves the “re-entrant locks” problem unsolved by Clay’s implementation
or the lock abstract syntax. State and configuration types are extensions of concepts
already present in my abstract machine. State types allow code to track operating
system without impacting run-time. Configuration types enable the programmer to
add invariants from abstractions directly to the code. By checking state-type values
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against the configuration-type values in function headers, the program guarantees
that the encoded abstractions are being enforced.
6.2 Additions To Code
In order to implement the abstractions required by the device driver, a significant
amount of type information was added to the function headers and several IO func-
tions had to be duplicated to easily handle different calling invariants. Relatively
little had to be done to the actual function calls other than small syntax changes
(adding “let”) and passing or returning state and configuration-type values in the
functions calls. As intended, most of the safety burden is on the few function headers
rather than the many function calls. The extra type information ballooned the 3c509
code from 945 lines to over 4000 lines of code.
6.3 Legacy Code Interaction
Interactions between Clay and C++ are simpler than those between Clay and C.
Function calls from Clay to C++ require a header declaration with a native marker
in the Clay code and wrapper functions to coerce the types output by Clay to those
expected by the legacy C++ code. The Shale operating system is written in C
and the interface between Clay and C requires extern “C” statements and wrapper
functions. It is difficult to pass function pointers between C and Clay since Clay
expects a more exact argument type.
6.4 Ease of Use
Clay is not an easy language to use. Some of the syntax differences between C and
Clay are subtle but important in the types they produce (e.g. int x = 3; vs let x =
3;). Writing Clay code with driver specifications includes time spent turning notes
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on the specification into mathematical comparisons (e.g. “The index is legal for the
array bounds” becomes [int N, type T, int I; 0 <= I && I < N ] for an array of type
Array[N, T ] and an index of type Int[I]). From personal experience understanding
uncommented Clay code is often very difficult. An informal survey of C programmers
indicated than the format of commented Clay code was readable but the types
were indecipherable without an explanation. Clay programmers who understood the
format and possibilities of Clay types should have less problem reading Clay code.
I have both ported some code from Clay to C (the driver) and written some code
directly in Clay (the lock code). In order to port the driver to Clay, I throughly
read the 3c509 manual and took notes on the specification it described. These notes
are presented in section 4.0.1. I also took notes on any specification implied by the
code and comments of Donald Becker’s 3c5x9 driver. Using my notes on the adapter
functionality, I created state types for all of the states the driver might need. This
included the “adapter busy” state and the port access configurations. Some of these
types are static and will not change as the driver runs. These types became the
nonlinear configuration types.
The driver consists mainly of memory operations on the shared data and IO
operations on the adapter. The memory operations were ported using Mems and
the load and store operations. Since the shared data structure consists of integers,
shorts, characters, arrays, and pointers, I created several different types of Mems
for each size and type of data. Each type of Mem needed its own set of load and
store interfaces. Donald Becker’s driver uses six assembly IO calls. I split these into
several different interfaces for the status checks, packet data accesses, commands,
and general IO operations. The interfaces for the commands were then split into
interfaces which changed various adapter states and generic command interfaces. All
total, the six assembly calls from C became about 20 wrapped assembly interfaces in
Clay. In order to share both the data structure and access to the adapter, I created a
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structure of all the adapter Mems and the state-type and configuration-type values.
The overall structure was linear and size 0 so it could be acquired from a lock. I
added one integer to the end of the actual shared data structure for the lock bit.
All code which uses this data structure assumes it has size sizeof(struct device) so
adding an integer to the end of the structure should not cause problems elsewhere.
The next step was to port the 3c509 portions of the 3c5x9 driver line by line. I
had to re-arrange some code sections in order to use the functional style required
by linear types. Conditional statements, for instance, require that the validity of a
linear value be the same before and after the statement, so all branches must leave
the linear with the same validity. When the driver was written, I moved on to type
checking and fixing mismatches between the specification and implementation. Most
of the mismatches involved typographical errors and dropped linears.
Porting the 3c509 driver to Clay took longer than it likely took to write the
original C driver. Once the code type checked, it ran with only one error. The
error was an incorrect data structure offset and was fixed within a few hours of
discovering it. In this case, it was a specification error (my C-to-Clay interface
specified the wrong data offset).
About half the porting time was spent writing a specification in mathematical
terms. This included describing all of the IO interfaces with arithmetic constraints
and integer type-parameters. The other half of the time was spent directly translat-
ing C syntax to Clay syntax. Because Clay implements abstractions not specifically
mentioned in C code, it is not possible to automatically translate all C to Clay and
produce a safe operating system that follows all the OS safety abstractions. However,
it would be possible to translate some C syntax to Clay syntax and add obvious type
information. This would speed up translation of operating system sections. Such a
translator does not currently exist but it could be a future project. The remainder







Figure 23: Network setup of my operating system and the 3c509 adapter
manual and tracking down invalid linear values.
Unlike porting C code to Clay, implementing locks in Clay did not take much
longer than implementing them in C. The lock specification in the abstract syntax
ported swiftly and easily to Clay.
6.5 Speed
I tested the ping program on 4 different versions of the operating system. All versions
run multi-threaded but some do not spawn a new thread for 3c509 interrupts. The
four versions are:
1. C 3c509 driver and same-thread 3c509 interrupts.
2. Clay 3c509 driver and same-thread 3c509 interrupts.
3. C 3c509 driver and spawned 3c509 interrupts.
4. Clay 3c509 driver and spawned 3c509 interrupts.
Figure 23 shows the setup of my testing network. Computer B runs the Shale
operating system and one 3c509 adapter. Computers A and C are connected only
through computer B. Computer C is protected by Shale’s firewall and IP mas-
querading so all access to C must originate from B or C.
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Pings
B to A B to C C to B C to A
1 C driver 1.387 ms 1.605 ms .528 ms .371 ms
2 Clay driver 1.387 ms 1.649 ms .391 ms .567 ms
3 C driver, spawn 1.399 ms 1.880 ms 5.42 ms 6.73 ms
4 Clay driver, spawn 2.118 ms 1.389 ms 4.4 ms 3.6 ms
Table 1: Timing test ping results.
For each version of Shale I ran 4 sets of 10 pings. The pings tested the connections
from B to A and C and from C to A and B. The connection from B to A is a control
since it does not involve the 3c509 adapter. For each set of 10 pings, I recorded the
quickest round trip time. I also recorded the slowest trip time but this information
is less useful because external factors could slow down a ping packet immeasurably
while factors inside Shale and the adapters limit the fastest possible round trip time.
Table 1 shows the fastest round trip ping packets between each computer using
the different versions of Shale. All trip times are in milliseconds. The versions of
Shale that spawn a new thread for each 3c509 interrupt are noticeably slower than
the versions which do not spawn on interrupt. The difference between round trips
with the C and Clay 3c509 drivers is negligible by comparison.
The Clay implementation of the 3c509 required several extra IO operations per
function and eliminated several run-time bounds checks. The extra IO operations
verified the current state-type values. In practice, these values are the expected
values so this approach erred on the side of caution. Therefore is it not unexpected
that the C and Clay versions of the 3c509 driver have similar trip times. The bounds
checks on data input from C code could also be eliminated if the rest of Shale was
written in Clay, further speeding up the Clay 3c509 driver.
The obvious conclusion is that spawning a new thread comes with substantial
overhead but a Clay implementation on its own does not. The Clay 3c509 driver
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on a non-spawning Shale can become deadlocked if a 3c509 interrupt comes in while
a packet is being sent. The packet function holds the data structure lock and the
interrupt function will block forever to acquire it. A compromise between always
spawning a thread on a 3c509 interrupt and never spawning one is to test the data
structure lock and only spawn a thread if the lock was already held. This way, a Clay
3c509 interrupt only spawns a new thread when it could otherwise cause deadlock.
6.6 Stress Tests
Although Clay theoretically prevents many errors, stress testing shows that the sys-
tem does not exhibit these errors under harsh conditions. I ran 2 types of stress tests
on the Clay 3c509 driver.
The first test spawned 18 threads on computer B. Each thread sent 3 ping re-
quests to computer C. Each interrupt generated by ping response packets spawned
another thread. This meant that a total of 54 threads were spawned. Any ping
request packets which did not fit into the transmit FIFO queue were dropped and
not transmitted. The read and write operations (ping request and ping response) be-
came interleaved as the process scheduler cycled through all the processes. The ping
packets sent out data varying in size from 32 to 828 bytes per packet. The threads
shared the driver data structure and did not cause adapter failure. No packets were
dropped.
The second test spawned 18 threads, again on computer B. Each thread sent
10 ping requests to computer C. The rest of the setup was the same as in the first
test. Three packets were not transmitted as a result of a full transmit FIFO. The
average round trip time per packet was about 10 times longer than packets sent
singly without all the other threads running simultaneously. This test was repeated
with 15 ping requests per thread and the number of dropped packets went up to 27.
Several ping response packets were received during the same interrupt.
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Overall, the adapter behaved as it is intended to under extreme load.
6.7 Extending this approach
My approach provides safety for locks, shared memory and system state, and IO
operations. It should easily apply to other operating system drivers which use the
above features. Its system-state tracking ability is limited to state which can be
expressed by boolean or integer arguments. State requiring more complex expression
methods would need a different form of state type. The configuration types are also
limited to integer and boolean arguments. At this time I have not seen any OS code
which would require such complex state or configuration types but I would not rule
out the possibility. Most drivers communicate with their device through some kind
of channel (IO calls or some other channel). The interfaces to the 3c509 IO calls
should generalize to interfaces on other IO calls or other channels.
Some low-level devices use memory-mapped control registers. These memory
locations are not under the control of the stack and thus do not have Mems and
cannot be accessed by load and store operations. They would need their own ca-
pability type and access functions. This capability type would likely be similar to
the PortConfig configuration type used by my 3c509 driver. The ports to access
3c509 registers cannot be accessed as standard memory and and required they own
capability types and IO access functions.
This approach should scale well with a few limitations. If large segments of code
are written in Clay with function and type specifications then each function can make
more assumptions about its inputs and fewer run-time checks will be necessary (For
instance, I currently make a run-time check for null data structure pointers on the
boundary of C OS code and Clay driver code. If more OS code was written in Clay,
these checks could be eliminated). On the downside, some linear values including
interrupt state would be used all over a multi-threaded OS written in Clay. Without
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global values, most functions would need to take and return this value. This problem




Related work on better operating systems can be separated into three categories:
expressive type-safe languages, which use type systems to prevent safety bugs; cor-
rectness and safety proofs, which prove an operating system or application is free
of certain safety or implementation bugs; and automated debuggers, which help
programmers find safety and implementation bugs.
7.1 Expressive Type-Safe Languages
Type-safe languages strive to prevent bugs that cause safety violations such as data
sharing errors, buffer overflows, pointer aliasing errors, and memory leaks. The
languages mentioned below all prevent a subset of safety violations.
Vault The Vault programming language [7] is an extended form of C that embeds
resource management protocols in the source code’s types. The protocols prevent
dangling references, memory leaks, race conditions, and other errors that can occur
if operations on resources happen out of order. The type checker automatically
enforces all protocols at compile time.
Vault’s “type guards” provide a way to specify protocols for temporal events.
The protocols can specify that events occur in a certain order, which operations
must occur before a data object is accessed, and that an operation must eventually
occur. For example, the type guard on a pointer might specify that the pointer must
be non-NULL before it is dereferenced.
There are several commands that can be used with a guard:
• Create a guard and a set of values
• Associate a guard with a variable
• Check the value of the guard
• Set the value of the guard
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• Add its flag to a global set of accessible guards
• Remove its flag from the set
A guarded value can only be accessed if its flag is in the global set and the guard
value matches given conditions. For example, a guarded pointer is created with a
guard value of NULL. When the pointer is set, the guard value changes to non-
NULL. Later the pointer can only be dereferenced if its flag is in the global set and
the guard value is non-NULL.
Flags can be removed from the global set to grant exclusive access to the guarded
resource. When exclusive access is no longer needed, the flag can be added to the
global set again. Flag removal and replacement provide a compile-time solution to
some aliasing problems that would otherwise require expensive reference counting.
Additional type information needed for the guards is used all over Vault programs
but is brief in each location. Like Clay, Vault provides compile-time safety checks.
Cyclone The Cyclone programming language [17, 15] is another extended form of
C which adds types to guarantee conditions about pointers and arrays and inserts run
time checks where needed if no compile time check is present. Additionally, Cyclone
adds support for convenient programing features including parametric polymorphism
and pattern matching.
Cyclone provides safety guarantees about pointer usage. It prevents the cast of
an integer to a pointer because this would allow code to overwrite a random memory
location. It also disallows pointer arithmetic on a * pointer unless special types are
used which can guarantee the pointer won’t be incremented out of bounds. Cyclone
inserts a NULL check with every * pointer dereference unless a special type has been
used guaranteeing the pointer is non-NULL. Together, these features mean that a
Cyclone program cannot crash due to * pointer errors.
Cyclone has several special pointer types that lessen the number of run time
checks its compiler inserts into code. These include @fat, @notnull, and @zeroterm
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pointers. @fat pointers keep track of bounds information and allow pointer arith-
metic with compile time error checks. @notnull pointers must be initialized when
they are declared and can be dereferenced safely without a NULL check. @zeroterm
pointers are used with C style char * strings. This type indicates that the string is
terminated by a 0 and can be combined with the @fat and @notnull types. When an
@zerterm (and @fat) pointer is initialized, the length of the sequence is computed
once and saved and the array indices can be checked statically. These three pointer
types allow a Cyclone programmer to move most pointer related safety checks from
run time to compile time.
Cyclone provides support for programming features often seen in ML or Haskell
programs but missing from C. Some of these features, such as parametric polymor-
phism, allow Cyclone to type check several unsafe portions of C (involving void *).
Other features, such as pattern matching, permit a concise way to pull small parts
out of a larger object. This is achieved with Haskell style let declarations and with
more powerful switch statements. The added features make programming easier and
provide ways to safely port C code to Cyclone.
Overall, Cyclone provides a safer version of C with many checks done at compile
time. Missing safety checks are inserted by the compiler. Work is in progress on
an application to port C to Cyclone and on a safe lock system resembling Java’s
synchronized [15, 10] .
Modula-3 for Extensible Operating Systems Hsieh et al. [13] added support
for extensible operating systems to Modula-3. Operating system extensions need to
handle pointer casting to avoid unnecessary data copies and make calls to and from
untrusted code. Safe extensions can directly access system services via system calls
and system data via load and store operations. Writing these extensions in a type-
safe language avoids many costly address-space switches. This research is similar
to mine in that it studies the needs of an operating system component and moves
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costly run-time steps to compile-time.
Typed Assembly Language Typing information is often lost during program
compilation. Morrisett et al. [19, 18] created a type system for assembly language to
preserve type information from higher level languages. The TAL assembler can type-
check programs written in a type-safe language and compiled to TAL. With typed
assembly, only one type checker is needed to check programs written in a variety
of languages. TALx86 is a version of TAL for the Intel Pentium. When the TAL
papers were published, a type-safe version of C called popcorn and part of Scheme
could be compiled to TAL.
7.2 Correctness and Safety Proofs
The OS verification approach to safety is very accurate but every time a change or
addition is made to the OS, the previous proofs are no longer valid and the process
needs to be done all over again. For this reason, the correctness proofs for an OS
are often not re-done after the OS is extended or changed.
A verified OS Kernel Bevier [2] wrote a small (10 page) OS kernel (KIT) in
assembly language. He translated the machine code for the kernel to Boyer-Moore
logic and used the Boyer-Moore theorem prover to prove its correctness. During this
process, many bugs were discovered and fixed.
Despite its small size, the kernel implements several distributed communicating
processes and provides many now-verified services including process scheduling, CPU
time allocation, error handling, message passing, and an interface to asynchronous
devices.
Proof Carrying Code Some verification methods put the burden on the pro-
grammer. An example of this is the Proof Carrying Code (PCC) of Necula and
Lee [20]. To use PCC, the OS kernel defines a safety policy and makes it public.
Applications use the policy to provide binaries with a proof that the code obeys the
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policy and the kernel validates the proofs during compile time. Proof generation is
difficult and a new proof must be generated with each version of the application; but
an automated proof generator has recently been created for Java programs.
Safe Machine Code Sirer et al. [28] discovered the difficulty of keeping type
information when integrating one language with another. This can cause verification
problems when a program is written in several languages or code written in one
language is run on an OS written in another language. (e.g. Modula-3 code and C
code in Sirer’s SPIN operating system).
To avoid multi-language problems, Xu et al. [33] developed a method of safety
checking machine code that only requires some type information and linear con-
straints from the programmer. The safety checker takes the desired safety properties
of an OS and checks that the machine code obeys these properties. This method al-
lows code additions to a program or operating system to be written in any language.
Coalgebraic Class Specification Language Tews [26] translated the memory
management portion of the Fiasco microkernel into the Coalgebraic Class Specifica-
tion programming language and created a set of properties that should be true for
the chosen code portion. The translated code and properties were run through the
PVS theorem prover and the properties were verified or rejected. Tews states that
the project took 3 months and much more time would be required to verify a full OS
because there is no automated method of translating C++ (the language of Fiasco)
into a language accepted by PVS.
Currently, Tews et al. [27] are verifying the whole Fiasco microkernel (about




Since there are so many types of debuggers, only two are mentioned here. Both
locate bugs on a large scale and are therefore suited for use on operating systems.
Bug Inference There are many debuggers currently available and significant
advances are being made towards new automated debugging methods that put little
burden on the programmer. One relatively recent advance is the heuristic bug checker
of Engler et al. [8]. This checker takes a few basic facts such as a dereferenced
pointer is non-NULL and a program and statically looks through the code to find
inconsistencies. It develops beliefs about the code without programmer input and
finds the points where beliefs are contradictory. If the code contains many points
where a lock is acquired and then released, the checker will develop the belief that
acquired locks are later released. If one lock is acquired twice in a row, this will
contradict the belief and the checker will report it as a possible error.
This debugging method is able to catch bugs that rarely manifest themselves
and are thus difficult to locate. However, bugs in actions that are taken only a few
times may not be caught unless the checker is specifically looking for them. Missed
bugs could include a pointer access followed by a Null check if few Null checks are
done. Other types of bugs including array bounds violations are completely out of
the range of this checker.
Engler et al. ran the bug inference system on the Linux and OpenBSD operating
systems and discovered hundreds of bugs, many of which have since been patched.
Their findings are published as Chou et al. [4]
Redundancy Checking Xi and Engler [32] recently showed that redundant code
operations correlate with errors and provided a tool to find such redundancy. Their
tool searches for idempotency errors (x = x, x/x, x‖x), redundant assignments
that are written but never read, code sections that can never run, and several other
error types. When testing it on Linux code, they found a few idempotency errors
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that could have devastating results. They also found over 2000 possible redundant
assignments; 129 of the 155 they inspected turned out to be real errors. The majority
of the dead-code errors inspected also turned out to be real errors. Their tool can
be used to find inconsistencies between the specification and implementation of a
program as well as logical inconsistencies in the control flow of a specification.
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8 Future Work
The main contributions of this research are concurrency and locks in an abstract syn-
tax with a proof of soundness, extended type concepts to better enforce abstractions,
and an implementation to show it actually works and provides safety guarantees to
a vulnerable system.
There are many directions for possible future work in this area of language theory.
The configuration types are used statically but there are no guarantees that their
types cannot be changed. Such changes cause unsafe code behavior. There are also
lock issues that the abstract machine does not handle. Looking at implementation
issues, Donald Becker’s 3c5x9 driver was written within the limits of C. A safe 3c509
driver written to follow the manual rather than an existing C driver might have fewer
errors and better speed if it was written to take advantage of Clay’s flexibility. A
safe operating system depends on more than just its drivers. Other safety-critical
system parts are likely to have needs not addressed by this research.
8.1 Static Configuration Types
The configuration type values needs by a network driver are all constant. The type
parameters do not change while the system is being run. Since functions that rely
on configuration types expect a given configuration type value to be static, changes
in a configuration type could cause unsafe behavior. Configuration types do not
currently have guarantees that they are static.
8.2 Re-writing Rather Than Porting The 3c509 Driver
Re-writing the 3c509 driver using the manual as a base rather than an existing driver
would have several benefits. Clay uses the syntax and rules of my abstract machine
to make many run-time safety checks possible at compile-time. A driver written to
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have as few run-time safety checks as possible is likely to be faster than the current
porting of the 3c5x9 driver to Clay. Errors propagated from driver to driver using
cut and paste techniques would also be eliminated.
8.3 Problems Remaining for Locks
The abstract syntax and rules of locks has moved some of the burden or correctness
from all uses of locks to the lock types and functions. A programmer using these
locks cannot produce ”forget to acquire” and ”release unheld lock” errors because
the type checker will catch them at compile time. This moves a large part of the
burden off of the numerous creation, acquiring, and releasing calls and onto the single
implementation of these functions.
The Clay compiler could catch ”forget to release” errors by noticing linear values
abandoned at the end of a code block. A better solution would allow the abstract
machine to catch these errors. This solution might involve checks on the current state
of a lock. While the ”re-entrant lock” problem can be solved by lock numbering,
there may be a better solution through types.
8.4 Improved Safer Locks
The native C functions are a continuing source of un-safety. The acquire and release
functions both currently call C functions and therefore contain chances for errors.
One way to limit the number of C functions that locks depend on is to rely on a
single swap function so that both acquire and release can use the same C function
to set the lock bit.
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8.5 Other Safety-critical OS Components
An operating system depends on the safety of many parts. These include interrupts,
the process scheduler, and inter-process communication. State and configuration
types may not handle all the needs of these safety-critical OS components. A safe
OS kernel would require further research into the needs of each important component.
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A Clay/Locks: Formal Definition
This section presents the complete syntax and rules for the abstract machine λconcurrent
which includes linear memory, concurrency support, and support for locks. λconcurrent
is a subset of λlow, described in [14], with additions for concurrency and locks and
a few corrections. It presents rules for evaluation of λconcurrentprograms along with
rules for type well-formedness and type checking. Since the Clay compiler strips
extraneous types from the code while compiling to C, this section also shows rules
for type erasure and subsequent untyped evaluation rules.
A.1 Abstract Syntax
This section defines the abstract syntax of λconcurrent. The letter x is used to indicate
a value variable, while α is used to indicate a type variable. As usual, we consider
expressions and types that differ only in bound variable names to be equivalent.
linearity






i = · · · | − 2 | − 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | · · ·
b = true | false





−→ τ2 | φ〈
−→τ 〉 | I | ∀α : K.τ | ∃α : K.τ
| Int(I) | Mem(I, τ) | Lock(I, τ) | bool
expressions
e = i | b | x | e1 e2 | eτ | φ〈
−→e 〉 | λx : τ
φ
−→ e | Λα : K.v | let 〈−→x 〉 = e1 in e2
| if e1 then e2 else e3 | pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 | unpack α, x = e1 in e2
| load(eptr, eMem) | store(eptr, eMem, ev) | release(eLock, eptr, eresource)
| create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) | acquire(eLock, eptr) | fix x : τ.v | fact | lock
values
v = i | b | Λα : K.v | pack[τ1, v] as∃α : K.τ2 | λx : τ
φ
−→ e | φ〈−→v 〉 | fact | lock
untyped expressions
d = i | b | x | d1 d2 | 〈
−→
d 〉 | λx −→ d | let 〈−→x 〉 = d1 in d2
| if d1 then d2 else d3 | fix x.u | load(dptr, dMem) | store(dptr, dMem, dv)
| create lock(dptr, dMem, dresource) | acquire(dLock, eptr) | release(dLock, dptr, dresource)
untyped values
u = i | b | λx −→ d | 〈−→u 〉
expressions for substitution
s = v | fix x : τ.v
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environments
M = {1 7→ v1, · · · , n 7→ vn}
R = {1 7→ 〈−→v1〉, · · · , n 7→ 〈
−→vn〉}
C = Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ
Ψ = {1 7→ τ1, · · · , n 7→ τn}
Θ = {1 7→ 〈−→τ1 〉, · · · , n 7→ 〈
−→τn〉}
∆ = {α1 7→ K1, · · · , αn 7→ Kn}
Γ = {x1 7→ τ1 · · · , xn 7→ τn}
untyped environments
L = {1 7→ u1, · · · , n 7→ un}
judgments
∆ ` τ : K
C ` e : τ
Ψspare; Θ; C ` (R, M, e : τ)
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′)
abbreviations
let x = e1 in e2 , let 〈x〉 =lin 〈e1〉 in e2
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Notes on environments
We treat the environments Ψ, Θ, ∆, Γ as sets, so the order of elements does not
matter: {x1 7→ τ1, x2 7→ τ2} = {x2 7→ τ2, x1 7→ τ1}.
The environments Ψ, Θ, ∆, Γ must be well-formed functions (and the definitions
in this thesis apply only to well-formed functions):
(i 7→ τ1 ∈ Ψ) ∧ (i 7→ τ2 ∈ Ψ) ⇒ τ1 = τ2
(i 7→ 〈−→τ1 〉 ∈ Θ) ∧ (i 7→ 〈
−→τ2 〉 ∈ Θ) ⇒ 〈
−→τ1 〉 = 〈
−→τ2 〉
(α 7→ K1 ∈ ∆) ∧ (α 7→ K2 ∈ ∆) ⇒ K1 = K2
(x 7→ τ1 ∈ Γ) ∧ (x 7→ τ2 ∈ Γ) ⇒ τ1 = τ2
For Ψ, Θ, ∆, Γ we use the usual function application notation:
Γ(x) = τ ⇔ x 7→ τ ∈ Γ.
Environment splitting
These definitions split environments into two parts, where linear elements must go
into exactly one of the parts:
Ψ = Ψ1, Ψ2 ⇔ (Ψ = Ψ1 ∪ Ψ2) ∧ (domain(Ψ1) ∪ domain(Ψ2) = ∅)
∆ ` Γ = Γ1, Γ2 ⇔ ∀x, τ. (∆ ` τ :
non
i ⇒ ((Γ(x) = τ) ⇔ (Γ1(x) = τ))
∧((Γ(x) = τ) ⇔ (Γ2(x) = τ)))
∧(∆ ` τ :
lin
i ⇒ ((Γ(x) = τ) ⇒ (Γ1(x) = τ)
xor(Γ2(x) = τ)))
∧(∆ ` τ :
lin
i ⇒ ((Γ(x) = τ) ⇐ (Γ1(x) = τ)
∨(Γ2(x) = τ)))
This defines how the entire set of enviromnents splits into two parts.
Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ = (Ψ1; Θ; ∆; Γ1), (Ψ2; Θ; ∆; Γ2) ⇔ (Ψ = Ψ1, Ψ2) ∧ (∆ ` Γ = Γ1, Γ2)
Environment extension
These add new elements to environments:
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Ψ, i 7→ τ , Ψ ∪ {i 7→ τ}, where i 6∈ domain(Ψ)
Θ, i 7→ 〈−→τ 〉 , Θ ∪ {i 7→ 〈−→τ 〉}, where i 6∈ domain(Θ)
∆, α 7→ K , ∆ ∪ {α 7→ K}, where α 6∈ domain(∆)
Γ, x 7→ τ , Γ ∪ {x 7→ τ}, where x 6∈ domain(Γ)
(Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ), i 7→ τ , (Ψ, i 7→ τ ; Θ; ∆; Γ),
(Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ), i 7→ 〈−→τ 〉 , (Ψ; Θ, i 7→ 〈−→τ 〉; ∆; Γ),
(Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ), α 7→ Kα , (Ψ; Θ; ∆, α 7→ Kα; Γ)
where α does not appear anywhere in (Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ).
(Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ), x 7→ τ , (Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ, x 7→ τ),




The non operator removes any linearity from an environment. We use it to prohibit
linearity in some of the type checking rules.
non
Γ (∆) , {x 7→ τ |(x 7→ τ ∈ Γ) ∧ (∆ ` τ :
non
i )}
If C = Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ, then
non





• (R1, M1, e1)
?
7→ (R2, M2, e2) means (R1, M1, e1) progresses in zero or one steps
to (R2, M2, e2).
• (R1, M1, e1)
∗
7→ (R2, M2, e2) means (R1, M1, e1) progresses in zero or more steps
to (R2, M2, e2).
• (R1, M1, e1)
+
7→ (R2, M2, e2) means (R1, M1, e1) progresses in one or more steps
to (R2, M2, e2).
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• (R1, M1, e1)
?,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (R2, M2, e2) means
(R1, M1, e1) progresses to (R2, M2, e2) by applying the given evaluation rule zero
or one times.
• (R1, M1, e1)
∗,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (R2, M2, e2) and
(R1, M1, e1)
+,(evaluation−rule)
7→ (R2, M2, e2) are defined in the same way as the
above definition.
Rules
R has been omitted from the evaluation rules which do not affect it. M has been
similarly omitted.
(E LOAD) (R, M, load(i, fact)) → (RM, lin 〈M(i), fact〉)
(E STORE) (R, M, store(i, fact, v)) → (R, [i 7→ v]M, fact)
(E CREATELOCK) (R, M, create lock(i, fact, vresource))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, M, lock)
(E ACQUIRE1) (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [i 7→ 1]M, vresource)
where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(i) = 0
(E ACQUIRE2) (R, M, acquire(lock, i)) → (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1
(E RELEASE1) (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource))
→ ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, [i 7→ 0]M, 〈〉)
where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1
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(E RELEASE2) (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource))
→ ((R, M, release(lock, i, vresource)))
where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(i) = 0
(E ABSAPP ) (λx : τ
φ
−→ e1)v2 → [x 7→ v2]e1
(E TABSTAPP ) (Λα : K.v)τ → [α 7→ τ ]v
(E LET ) let 〈x1, · · · , xn〉 = φ〈v1, · · · , vn〉 in e → [x1 7→ v1, · · · , xn 7→ vn]e
(E IF1) if true then e1 else e2 → e1
(E IF2) if false then e1 else e2 → e2
(E UNPACK) unpack α, x = (pack[τ1, v1] as τ2)in e2 → [α 7→ τ1, x 7→ v1]e2
(E FIX) fix x : τ.v → [x 7→ fix x : τ.v]v




use E to indicate an expression with one (shallowly dug) hole in it, and E[e] to
indicate the expression with the hole replaced by e, so that a single evaluation rule
covers all the cases. This is only for notational convenience.
E[e] = eτ | pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 | unpack α, x = e in e2 | ee2 | v1e
| φ〈ei, · · · , ek−1, e, ek+1, · · · , en〉 | let 〈
−→x 〉 = e in e2 | if e then e2 else e3
| load(e, eMem) | load(vptr, e)
| store(e, eMem, ev) | store(vptr, e, ev) | store(vptr, vMem, e)
| create lock(e, eMem, eresource) | create lock(vptr, e, eresource)
116
| create lock(vptr, vMem, e) | acquire(e, eptr) | acquire(vLock, e)
| release(e, eptr, eresource) | release(vLock, e, eresource) | release(vLock, vptr, e)
(congruence rule)
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′)
(R, M, E[e]) → (R′, M ′, E[e′])
e → e′
(R, M, e) → (R, M, e′)
A.3 Type Well-formedness Rules
(K IV AR) ∆ ` i : int
(K TV AR) ∆, α : K ` α : K




∆, α : K ` τ :
φ
i




∆, α : K ` τ :
φ
i




∆ ` τ1 :
φ1









∀j.(∆ ` τj :
non
ij )








∀j.(∆ ` τj :
φj
ij)








∆ ` I : int





∆ ` I : int ∆ ` τ :
non
1




∆ ` I : int ∆ ` τ :
lin
0




(T FREE) Int(0); 〈τMem, τresource〉 ` 〈τMem, τresource〉
(T HELD) Int(1); 〈τMem, τresource〉 ` 〈τMem〉
A.4 Type Checking Rules
(T RMe)
Ψ = Ψspare, Ψe, ΨR1, · · · , ΨRn Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` e : τ
∀i ∈ dom(Ψ).(∅; Θ; ∅; ∅ ` M(i) : Ψ(i))
∀i ∈ dom(Θ).(ΨRi; Θ; ∅; ∅ ` R(i) : τi and Ψ(i); Θ(i) ` τi)
Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ ` (R, M, e : τ)
(T V AR)
non
C , x : τ ` x : τ
(T FACT )
non
C , I 7→ τ ` fact : Mem(I, τ)
(T LOCK) ∅; Θ, I 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(J)), τ2〉; ∆;
non
Γ ` lock : Lock(I, τ2)
where J = 0 or J = 1
(T BOOL)
non
C ` b : bool
(T INT )
non
C ` i : Int(i)
(T LOAD)
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, τ)
C1, C2 ` load(eptr, eMem) :lin 〈τ, Mem(I, τ)〉
(T STORE)
C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, τ1) C3 ` ev : τ2
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C1, C2, C3 ` τ2 :
non
1
C1, C2, C3 ` store(eptr, eMem, ev) : Mem(I, τ2)
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(T TABS)
C, α : K ` v : τ
C ` Λα : K.v : ∀α : K.τ
(T TAPP )
C ` e : ∀α : K.τ1 C ` τ2 : K




C , C1, · · · , Cn
∀i.(Ci ` ei : τi) C ` φ〈
−→τ 〉 : K
C ` φ〈−→e 〉 : φ〈−→τ 〉
(T ABS)








Γ` λx : τ1
φ




C1, C2 = Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ
C1 ` e1 : τa
φ
−→ τb C2 ` e2 : τa
C1, C2 ` e1e2 : τb
(T LET )
Ca ` ea : 〈
−→τ 〉 Cb,
−−→x : τ ` eb : τb
Ca, Cb ` let〈
−→x 〉 = ea in eb : τb
(T FIX)
C ` τ :
φ
i C, x : τ ` v : τ
C ` (fix x : τ.v) : τ
(T PACK)
C ` τ1 : K C ` ∃α : K.τ2 :
φ
i
C ` e : [α 7→ τ1]τ2
C ` pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2 : ∃α : K.τ2
(T UNPACK)
C1 ` e1 : ∃α : K.τ1
C2, α : K, x : τ1 ` e2 : τ2
C1, C2 ` unpack α, x = e1 in e2 : τ2
(T IF )
Ca ` e1 : bool Cb ` e2 : τ Cb ` e3 : τ
Ca, Cb ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : τ
(T CREATELOCK)
C1 ` eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eMem : Mem(I, Int(0))
C3 ` eresource : τ :
lin
0
C1, C2, C3 ` create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) : Lock(I, τ)
119
(T ACQUIRE)
C ` eLock : Lock(I, τ) eptr : Int(I)
C ` acquire(eLock, eptr) : τ
(T RELEASE)
C1 ` eLock : Lock(I, τ) eptr : Int(I) C2 ` eresource : τ
C1, C2 ` release(eLock, eptr, eresource) :non 〈〉
A.5 Type Erasure Rules
The erasure rules are defined only for well-typed terms: to erase types, we require a
derivation of some judgment C ` (R, M, e : τ) to be given, and we use the derivation
to annotate subexpressions inside (R, M, e) with types. Specifically, if e = ...e1...,
and the derivation of C ` (R, M, e : τ) contains the judgment C1 ` e1 : τ1, then we
annotate e with τ1 as e = ...(e1 : τ1)... when convenient. We annotate types with
kinds in a similar fashion. These annotations guide the erasure rules.
(ER RMe) erase((R, M, e)) = ( erase(M), erase(e))
(ER M) erase(M) = {1 7→ erase(v1), · · · , n 7→ erase(vn)}
(ER i) erase(i) = i
(ER b) erase(b) = b
(ER x) erase(x) = x
(ER APP ) erase(e1 e2) = erase(e1) erase(e2)
(ER APPT ) erase(e τ) = erase(e)
(ER TUPLE) erase(φ〈e1, . . . , en〉) = 〈 erase(e1), . . . , erase(en)〉
(ER FUN) λx : τ
φ
−→ e = λx −→ erase(e)
(ER TFUN) erase(Λα : K.v) = erase(v)
(ER LET ) erase(let 〈−→x 〉 = e1 in e2) = let 〈
−→x 〉 = erase(e1) in erase(e2)
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(ER IF ) erase(if e1 then e2 else e3) = if erase(e1) then erase(e2) else erase(e3)
(ER PACK) erase(pack[τ1, e] as∃α : K.τ2) = erase(e)
(ER UNPACK) erase(unpack α, x = e1 in e2) = let x = erase(e1) in erase(e2)
(ER FIX) erase(fix x : t :
φ
i .v) = fix x. erase(v) where i > 0
(ER FIX0) erase(fix x : t :
φ
0 .v) = 〈〉
(ER FACT ) erase(fact) = 〈〉
(ER LOAD) erase(load(eptr, eMem)) = load( erase(eptr), erase(eMem))
(ER STORE) erase(store(eptr, eMem, ev))
= store( erase(eptr), erase(eMem), erase(ev))
(ER LOCK) erase(lock) = 〈〉
(ER CREATELOCK) erase(create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource))
= create lock( erase(eptr), erase(eMem), erase(eresource))
(ER ACQUIRE) erase(acquire(eLock, eptr)) = acquire( erase(eLock), erase(eptr))
(ER RELEASE) erase(release(eLock, eptr, eresource))
= release( erase(eLock), erase(eptr), erase(eresource))
A.6 Untyped Evaluation Rules
Some of the evaluation rules will work for both typed and untyped evaluation. These
new rules apply to untyped evaluation when the standard evaluation rules cannot.
(D LOAD) (L, load(i, 〈〉)) → (L, 〈L(i), 〈〉〉)
(D STORE) (L, store(i, 〈〉, u)) → ([i 7→ u]L, 〈〉)
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(D ABSAPP ) (λx −→ d1)u2 → [x 7→ u2]d1
(D FIX) fix x.u → [x 7→ fix x.u]u
(D CREATELOCK) (L, create lock(i, 〈〉, 〈〉)) → (L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 0
(D ACQUIRE1) (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) → ([i 7→ 1]L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 0
(D ACQUIRE2) (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) → (L, acquire(〈〉, i)) where L(i) = 1
(D RELEASE1) (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) → ([i 7→ 0]L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 1
(D RELEASE2) (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) → (L, release(〈〉, i, 〈〉)) where L(i) = 0
B Clay/Locks: Soundness Proof
This section provides a proof of soundness (type safety) for λconcurrent. Soundness
means that well-typed programs will never get stuck. The proof consists of a proof of
preservation and a proof of progress, in the syntactic style of [30] (also see [22] for an
general introduction to syntactic approaches to semantics and types). Preservation
says that a well-typed program steps to another well-typed program. Progress says
that a well-typed program can always step unless it is in an acknowledged end state,
a value. This chapter also presents a proof that the extraneous types can be erased
without upsetting the run-time behavior. Supporting lemmas stated here without
proof are proven in [14].
Formally stated, the theorems proved here are:
Preservation: If Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` e : τ and Ψspare, Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` (R, M, e : τ)
and (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′), then Ψ′e; Θ
′
e; ∆; Γ ` e
′ : τ and Ψspare, Ψ
′
e; Θ
′; ∆; Γ `
(R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
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Progress: If (R, M, e) is closed and well-typed (C ` (R, M, e : τ) for some τ and
C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅), then either e is a value or else there is some (R′, M ′, e′) so that
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′).
Erasure: If (R, M, e) is closed and well-typed (C ` (R, M, e : τ) for some τ and
C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅) then the following hold:
1. If (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′) then erase((R, M, e))
?
→ erase((R′, M ′, e′)).
2. If erase((R, M, e)) → (L′, d′), then (R, M, e)
+
→ (R′, M ′, e′) and
erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′).
3. If erase(e) is a value, then erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′) and erase((R, M, e)) =
erase((R, M, v)).
B.1 Preservation Lemmas
LEMMA [WEAKENING FOR TERMS]
(C1 ⊆ C2) ∧ (C1 ` e : τ) ⇒ (C2 ` e : τ).
LEMMA [WEAKENING FOR TYPES]
(C1 ⊆ C2) ∧ (C1 ` τ : K) ⇒ (C2, C3 ` τ : K).
LEMMA [SPLIT SUBSET]
If C = C1, C2 and C1
non
⊆ C ′1, then there is some C
′
2 such that C2
lin






If C = C1, C2 and C1
non
⊆ C ′1, then there is some C
′












α : Kα ` τ : K, and C ` ταi : Kαi , then C ` [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]τ : K.
(Corollary, via the type environment substitution lemma: if C,
−−−−→
α : Kα ` τ : K,
and C ` ταi : Kαi, then [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]C ` [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]τ : K.)
LEMMA [TERM SUBSTITUTION]
If we make the following definitions and assumptions:




• C = Ψ; Θ; ∆; Γ
• No αi appears free in Ψ; Θ; ∆ (note: typically, this condition can be satisfied
by alpha-renaming αi before invoking this lemma).
• [−−−−→α 7→ τα]C = Ψ; Θ; ∆; [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]Γ is syntactically well-formed (this assumption






−−−→y : τy ` e : τ
• zi /∈ domain(Γ)
• [−−−−→α 7→ τα]
non
C ` sxi : [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]τxi (where τxi are nonlinear types)
• [−−−−→α 7→ τα](
non
C , Cyi) ` syi : [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]τyi (where τyi are linear types)
• [−−−−→α 7→ τα](
non
C , Czi) ` szi : [
−−−−→α 7→ τα]τzi (where τzi are linear types)
• C ` ταi : Kαi
then we can conclude the following:
• [−−−−→α 7→ τα](C,
−→




Some abreviations used in the preservation proof:
Ce = Ψe; Θe; ∆; Γ
C = Ψspare, Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ










This lemma is the last step common to all cases of the preservation proof. In all
proofs where R’ and M’ are well typed, ∀i ∈ dom(Ψ).(C∅ ` M
′(i) : Ψ(i)), ∀i ∈
dom(Θ).(C∅ ` Θ(i) = 〈τMem, τresource〉).M(i) : Int(0) or M(i) : Int((1)) If M(i) :




τ so by (T RMe), C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
B.2 Proof of Preservation
If Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` e : τ , Ψspare, Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` (R, M, e : τ) and (R, M, e) → (R
′, M ′, e′),
then Ψ′e; Θ
′; ∆; Γ ` e′ : τ and Ψspare, Ψ
′
e; Θ
′; ∆; Γ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Prove by induction on the type derivation. The cases below omit most of the
congruence rule cases, because the proofs for these all look more or less alike. See
the load, store, and createlock cases for examples of the proofs for congruence rule
cases.
1. Case (T LOAD): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = Cptr, CMem `
load(eptr, eMem) : lin〈τ1, Mem(I, τ1)〉 where Cptr = ∅; ∅; ∆;
non
Γ eptr` eptr : Int(I)
and CMem = {I 7→ τ1}; ∅; ∆;
non
Γ eMem` eMem : Mem(I, τ1). The evaluation rules
that let e → e′ are (E LOAD) and the congruence rules for load.
Using (E LOAD), Cptr ` i : Int(I), CMem ` fact : Mem(I, τ1), and
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(R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, lin〈M(i), fact〉). By Weakening for Terms Ce = Cptr, CMem
and CMem ⊆ Ce and CMem ` fact : Mem(I, τ1) so Ce = {I 7→ τ1}; ∅; ∆; Γ `
fact : Mem(I, τ1). Since M is well typed, Ce ` M(i) : Ψe(i) so Ce `
M(i) : τ1. Ψe and Θ are unchanged by (E LOAD) so C
′
e ` lin〈M(i), fact〉 :
lin〈τ1, Mem(I, τ1)〉 so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R and M are unchanged so (FINAL-STEP)
applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = load(e, eMem), (R, M, eptr) → (R
′, M ′, e′ptr).
Since Cptr = ∅; ∅; ∆; Γeptr ` eptr : Int(I), Ψspare; Θ; ∆; Γeptr ` (R, M, eptr :
Int(I)). By induction, C ′ptr = Ψ
′
eptr ; Θ
′; ∆; Γeptr ` e
′




′; ∆; Γeptr ` (R
′, M ′, e′ptr : Int(I)). Since C = Cptr, CMem, and
Cptr ⊆ C
′
ptr, by the split subset lemma, there is a C
′
Mem such that CMem ⊆ C
′
Mem






e. By Weakening for Terms C
′
Mem `




ptr, eMem) : lin〈τ1, Mem(I, τ1)〉
so C ′e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = load(vptr, e), (R, M, eMem) → (R
′, M ′, e′Mem).
C2 = {I 7→ τ1}; ∅; ∆; ΓeMem ` eMem : Mem(I, τ1) and
Ψspare, {I 7→ τ1}; Θ;∆; ΓeMem ` (R, M, eMem : Mem(I, τ1)). By induction,
C ′mem = Ψ
′
eMem
; Θ′; ∆; ΓeMem ` e
′




; Θ′; ∆; ΓeMem ` (R
′, M ′, e′Mem : Mem(I, τ1)). Since C =
Cptr, CMem, and CMem ⊆ C
′
Mem, by the split subset lemma, there is a C
′
ptr such
that Cptr ⊆ C
′






e. By Weakening for Terms
C ′ptr ` vptr : Int(I). By (T LOAD) C
′
e ` load(vptr, e
′
Mem) : lin〈τ1, Mem(I, τ1)〉
so C ′e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
2. Case (T STORE): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and
C ` e : τ = Cptr, CMemCv ` store(eptr, eMem, ev) : Mem(I, τ2) where
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Cptr = Ψeptr ; Θ; ∆; Γeptr ` eptr : Int(I), CMem = ΨeMem ; Θ; ∆; ΓeMem ` eMem :
Mem(I, τ1), C3v = Ψev; Θ; ∆; Γev ` ev : τ2, and ∆ ` τ2 :
non
1 . The evaluation
rules that let e → e′ are (E STORE) and the congruence rules for store.
Using (E STORE), Cptr = ∅; ∅; ∆;
non
Γ eptr` i : Int(I),
CMem = {i 7→ τ1}; ∅; ∆;ΓeMem ` fact : Mem(I, τ1), Cv = ∅; ∅; ∆; Γev ` v : τ2,
and (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, [i 7→ v]M, fact). C ′e = {i 7→ τ2}; ∅; ∆; Γ. By (T FACT )
{i 7→ τ2}; ∅; ∆; Γ ` fact : Mem(I, τ2) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R′ = R, and M’ is still well
typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = store(e, emem, ev), (R, M, eptr) → (R
′, M ′, e′ptr),
and (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′). By Weakening for Terms, Ce ` eptr : Int(I) and











′; ∆; Γeptr ` (R
′, M ′, e′ptr : Int(I)). Since C = Cptr, CMem/v,
and Cptr ⊆ C
′











e. By Weakening for
Terms C ′Mem/v ` eMem : Mem(I, τ1) and C
′
Mem/v ` ev : τ2 . By (T STORE)
C ′e ` store(e
′
ptr, eMem, ev) : Mem(I, τ2) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are well typed
so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = store(vptr, e, ev), (R, M, eMem) →
(R′, M ′, e′Mem), and (R, M, e) → (R
′, M ′, e′). By induction, C ′Mem =
Ψ′eMem ; Θ
′; ∆; ΓeMem ` e
′





; Θ′; ∆; ΓeMem `
(R′, M ′, e′Mem : Mem(I, τ1)). Since C = Cptr/v, CMem, and CMem ⊆ C
′
Mem,
by the split subset lemma, there is a C ′ptr/v such that Cptr/v ⊆ C
′
ptr/v






e. By Weakening for Terms
C ′ptr/v ` vptr : Int(I) and C
′
ptr/v ` ev : τ2. By (T STORE)
C ′e ` store(eptr, e
′
Mem, ev) : Mem(I, τ2) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are
well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = store(vptr, fact, e), (R, M, ev) → (R
′, M ′, e′v),
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and (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′). By induction, C ′v = Ψ
′
ev; Θ






′; ∆; Γev ` (R
′, M ′, e′v : τ2). Since C = Cptr/Mem, Cv,
and Cv ⊆ C
′












for Terms C ′ptr/Mem ` vptr : Int(I) and C
′
ptr/Mem ` fact : Mem(I, τ1). By
(T STORE) C ′e ` store(eptr, eMem, e
′
v) : Mem(I, τ2) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’
are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
3. Case (T CREATELOCK): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and
Ce ` e : τ = Cptr, CMem, Cresource` create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) : Lock(I, τ1)
where Cptr = ∅; Θ; ∆; Γeptr ` eptr : Int(I) and
CMem = {I 7→ Int(0)}; ∅; ∆; ΓeMem ` eMem : Mem(I, Int(0)) and Cresource `
eresource : τ1 :
lin
0 . The evaluation rules that let e → e′ are (E CREATELOCK)
and the congruence rules for create lock.
Using (E CREATELOCK), Cptr ` i : Int(I), CMem ` fact : Mem(I, Int(0)),
Cresource ` vr : τ1, and (R
′, M ′, e′) = ([i 7→ 〈fact, vr〉]R, M, lock). C
′
e = {I 7→
Int(0)}; {I 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(0)), τ1〉}, Θ; ∆; Γ. By (T LOCK1), C
′
e ` lock :
Lock(I, τ1) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R’ is still well typed and M = M ′ so (FINAL-
STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = create lock(e, eMem, eresource),
(R, M, eptr) → (R
′, M ′, e′ptr). ∅; ∅; ∆; Γeptr ` eptr : Int(I) and
Ψspare; Θ; ∆; Γeptr ` (R, M, eptr : Int(I)). By induction,
C ′ptr = Ψ
′
eptr ; Θ
′; ∆; Γeptr ` e
′





′; ∆; Γeptr `
(R′, M ′, e′ptr : Int(I)). Since C = Cptr, CMem/resource, and Cptr ⊆ C
′
ptr, by
the split subset lemma, there is a C ′Mem/resource such that CMem/resource ⊆







for Terms C ′Mem/resource ` eMem : Mem(I, τ1) and C
′
Mem/resource ` eresource : τ1.
By (T CREATELOCK) C ′e ` create lock(e
′
Ptr, eMem, eresource) : Lock(I, τ1)
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so C ′e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = create lock(vptr, e, eresource),
(R, M, eMem) → (R
′, M ′, e′Mem). {I 7→ Int(0)}; ∅; ∆; ΓeMem ` eMem :
Mem(I, Int(0)) and Ψspare, {I 7→ Int(0)}; Θ; ∆; ΓeMem ` (R, M, eMem :
Mem(I, Int(0))). By induction, C ′Mem = Ψ
′
eMem







; Θ′; ∆; ΓeMem ` (R
′, M ′, e′Mem : Mem(I, Int(0))). Since C =
Cptr/resource, CMem, and CMem ⊆ C
′
Mem, by the split subset lemma, there is
a C ′ptr/resource such that Cptr/resource ⊆ C
′





e. By Weakening for Terms C
′
ptr/resource ` vptr : Int(I)
and C ′ptr/resource ` eresource : τ1. By (T CREATELOCK)
C ′e ` create lock(ePtr, e
′
Mem, eresource) : Lock(I, τ1) so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are
well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (congruence rule)E[e] = create lock(vptr, vMem, e),
(R, M, eresource) → (R
′, M ′, e′resource). Ψeresource ; Θ; ∆; Γeresource ` eresource : τ1 and




′; ∆; Γeresource ` e
′




′; ∆; Γeresource ` (R
′, M ′, e′resource : τ1). Since C =
Cptr/Mem, Cresource, and Cresource ⊆ C
′
resource, by the split subset lemma, there is
a C ′ptr/Mem such that Cptr/Mem ⊆ C
′
ptr/Mem and






e. By Weakening for Terms
C ′ptr/Mem ` vptr : Int(I) and C
′
ptr/Mem ` eMem : Mem(I, Int(0)). By
(T CREATELOCK) C ′e ` create lock(ePtr, eMem, e
′
resource) : Lock(I, τ1) so
C ′e ` e
′ : τ . R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
4. Case (T ACQUIRE): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = acquire(eLock, eptr) : τ
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where Ce ` eLock : Lock(I, τ) and Ce ` eptr : Int(I). The evaluation rules that
let e → e′ are (E ACQUIRE1), (E ACQUIRE2), and the congruence rules
for acquire.
Using (E ACQUIRE1), R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉, M(i) = 0,
Ce = {I 7→ Int(0)}; {I 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(0)), τ〉}; ∆; ΓeLock ` lock : Lock(I, τ),
Ce ` i : Int(I), and
(R′, M ′, e′) = ([i 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [i 7→ 1]M, vresource). Because R and M were well
typed, by (T RMe) Ce ` vresource : τ .
C ′e = {I 7→ Int(1)}; {I 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(1)), τ〉}; ∆; Γ ` vresource : τ so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ .
R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (E ACQUIRE2), (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, e). Ce ` e : τ so Ce = C
′
e ` e
′ : τ .
R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
5. Case (T RELEASE): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and
Ce ` e : τ = C1, C2 ` release(eLock, eptr, eresource) :non 〈〉, C1 ` eLock : Lock(I, τ1),
C1 ` eptr : Int(I), and C2 ` eresource : τ1. The evaluation rules that let e → e
′
are (E RELEASE1), (E RELEASE2) and the congruence rules for release.
Using (E RELEASE1), R(i) = 〈fact〉, M(i) = 1,
C1 = {i 7→ Int(1)}; {i 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(1)), τ1〉}; ∆;
non
Γ 1` lock : Lock(I, τ1), i :
Int(I), and C2 = Ψ2; Θ; ∆; Γ2 ` vr : τ1, and




τ . Ψ′spare = {i 7→ Int(1)}, Ψspare, Θ
′ = {i 7→ 〈Mem(I, Int(1)), τ1〉}, R’ and M’
are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (E RELEASE2), (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, e). Ce ` e : τ so Ce = C
′
e ` e
′ : τ .
R’ and M’ are well typed so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
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rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
6. Case (T V AR), (T FACT ), (T LOCK), (T INT ), (T TABS), (T ABS),
(T PACK): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ . There are no evaluation rules
for e.
7. Case (T TAPP ): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = Ce ` e1τ2 : [α 7→ τ2]τ1
where Ce ` e1 : ∀α : K.τ1 and Ce ` τ2 : K. The evaluation rules that let e → e
′
are (E TAPPTABS) and (congruence rule)E[e] = eτ .
Using (E TAPPTABS), e1 = Λα : K; B.v1 : ∀α : K.τ1 and e
′ = [α 7→ τ2]v1.
By Inversion (TABS), Ce, α : K ` v1 : τ1. By Term Substiution, Ψe; Θ; ∆; [α 7→
τ2]Γ ` [α 7→ τ2]v1 : [α 7→ τ2]τ1. We can use α-renaming to ensure that αis
not found in Γ. Therefore Ψe; Θ; ∆; Γ ` [α 7→ τ2]v1 : [α 7→ τ2]τ1 = τ
′ and
τ = τ ′ so C ′e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are unchanged so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rule follows the same format as the congruence
rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
8. Case (T TUPLE). Only congruence rules apply and they follow the same
format as the congruence rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock
cases.
9. Case (T APP ): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = C1, C2 ` e1e2 : τ where
C1 ` e1 : τ1
φ
−→ τ and C2 ` e2 : τ1. The evaluation rules that let e → e
′ are
(E APPABS) and the congruence rules for app.
Using (E APPABS), C1 ` λx : τ1
φ
−→ e11 : τ1
φ
−→ τ , C2 ` v : τ1, (R
′, M ′, e′) =
(R, M, [x 7→ v]e11). By Term Substitution, Ce, x : τ1 ` e11 : τ . Ce, x : τx `
[x 7→ v]e11 : [τ1 7→ τ1]τ . This does not change τ so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are
unchanged so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
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10. Case (T LET ): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = C1, C2 ` let 〈
−→xi 〉 = ea in eb :
τ where C1 ` ea : 〈
−→τi 〉 and C2,
−−→x : τ ` eb : τ . The evaluation rules that let
e → e′ are (E LET ) and the congruence rules for let.
Using (E LET ), C1 ` 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 : 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 and (R
′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, [x1 7→
v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn]eb). By Term Substitution, C
′
e,
−−→x : τ ` [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→
vn]eb : [τ1 7→ τ1, . . . , τn 7→ τn]τ . This does not change τ so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . M and R
are unchanged so (FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
11. Case (T FIX): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = (fix x : τ.v) : τ where
Ce ` τ :
φ
i and Ce, x : τ ` v : τ . The evaluation rule that lets e → e
′ is (E FIX).
Using (E FIX), (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, [x 7→ fix x : τ.v]v). By Term Substi-
tution, C ′e, x : τ ` [x 7→ fix x : τ.v]v : [τ 7→ τ ]τ . This does not change
τ so C ′e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are unchanged so (FINAL-STEP) applies and
C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
12. Case (T UNPACK): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = C1, C2 `
unpack α, x = e1 in e2 : τ where C1 ` e1 : ∃α : K.τ1 and C2, α : K, x : τ1 ` e2 : τ .
The evaluation rules that let e → e′ are (E UNPACK) and the congruence
rules for unpack.
Using (E UNPACK), C1 ` (pack[τ2, v1] as∃α : K.τ1) : ∃α : K.τ1 and
(R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, [α 7→ τ2, x 7→ v1]e2). C1 ` τ2 : K C1 ` v1 : [α 7→ τ2]τ1,
C1 ` ∃α : K.τ1 :
φ
i. By Term Substitution, [α 7→ τ2, x 7→ v1]C
′
e, x : τ1 ` [α 7→
τ2, x 7→ v1]e2 : [α 7→ τ2, x 7→ v1]τ becomes C
′
e, x : [α 7→ τ2]τ1 ` [α 7→ τ2, x 7→
v1]e2 : [α 7→ τ2]τ . By alpha-renaming, we can ensure αis not found in τso
C ′e ` [α 7→ τ2, x 7→ v1]e2 : τ and C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are unchanged so
(FINAL-STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
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rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
13. Case (T IFE): C ` (R, M, e : τ) and Ce ` e : τ = C1, C2 ` if e1 then e2 else e3 :
τ where C1 ` e1 : bool and C2, true ` e2 : τ , and C3, false ` e2 : τ . The evalu-
ation rules that let e → e′ are (E IF1), (E IF2) and the congruence rules for
if.
Using (E IF1), C1 ` e1 = true : bool and (R
′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, e2). By
Weakening for Terms Ce = C1, C2, C3 and C2 ⊆ Ce and C2 ` e2 : τ so
Ce = Ψe; ∅; ∆; Γ ` e2 : τ so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are unchanged so (FINAL-
STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
Using (E IF2), C1 ` e1 = false : bool and (R
′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, e3). By
Weakening for Terms Ce = C1, C2, C3 and C3 ⊆ Ce and C3 ` e3 : τ so
Ce = Ψe; ∅; ∆; Γ ` e3 : τ so C
′
e ` e
′ : τ . M and R are unchanged so (FINAL-
STEP) applies and C ′ ` (R′, M ′, e′ : τ).
The proof for the congruence rules follows the same format as the congruence
rule proofs shown in the load, store, and createlock cases.
B.3 Progress Lemmas
LEMMA [CANONICAL FORMS]
Suppose v is a closed, well-typed expression: C ` v : τ for some τ, C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅.
The first 6 cases only differ from [14] by the elimination of B; limit.
1. If C ` v : τ1
φ
−→ τ2, then v = λx : τ1
φ
−→ e.
2. If C ` v : 〈τ1, . . . τn〉, then v = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉.
3. If C ` v : ∀α : K.τ , then v = Λα : K.v0.
4. If C ` v : ∃α : K.τ2, then v = pack[τ1, v0] as∃α : K.τ2.
5. If C ` v : Int(I), then v = i.
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6. If C ` v : Mem(I, τ) then v = fact.
7. If C ` v : Lock(I, τ) then v = lock.
Proof :
Only one type checking rule can prove C ` v : Lock(I, τ). By (T Lock), we know
v = lock.
B.4 Proof of Progress
If (R, M, e) is closed and well-typed (CRMe ` (R, M, e : τ) for some τ and CRMe =
ΨRMe; ΘRMe; ∅; ∅), then either e is a value or else there is some (R
′, M ′, e′) so that
(R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′).
Observe that by the rule for typing (R, M, e), we know that ΨRMe = Ψspare, Ψ
and ΘRMe = Θ and C ` e : τ , where C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅. Now prove that (R, M, e)
steps, by induction on the derivation of C ` e : τ (holding M , ΨRMe, and ΘRMe
fixed throughout the induction as C, e, and τ vary). Several cases have not changed
since [14] and have been omitted. Store, load, and the congruence rules are mostly
unchanged and are shown here for consistency.
Proof :
First, if e = E[e0] where e0 is not a value, then by inspection of the type checking
rules, C0 ` e0 : τ0, where C0 = Ψ0; Θ0; ∅; ∅ and ΨMe = Ψ0−spare, Ψ0 ΘMe = Θ0, so by
induction, (R, M, e0) → (R
′, M ′, e′0), so (R, M, e) = (R, M, E[e0]) → (R
′, M ′, E[e′0]).
For all other cases where e is not a value:
1. e = load(vptr, vMem),
where (T LOAD) C1`vptr:Int(I) C2`vMem:Mem(I,τ)
C1,C2`load(vptr,vMem):lin〈τ,Mem(I,τ)〉
.
By canonical forms, vptr = iptr, and vHas = fact. By inversion, C1 ` iptr :
Int(iptr) and C2 = C
′
2, ihas 7→ τ ` fact : Mem(ihas, τ). Together, these imply
iptr = ihas. Since Ψ(ihas) = τ and memory M is well-typed under CMe =
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ΨMe; ..., where ΨMe = Ψspare, Ψ, we know ihas 7→ τ ∈ ΨMe, so M(ihas) exists,
so M(iptr) exists, so e steps by (E LOAD).
2. e = store(vptr, vMem, vv),
where (T STORE)
C2 ` vMem : Mem(I, τ1) C3 ` vv : τ2





By canonical forms, vptr = iptr, and vHas = fact, so e steps by (E STORE).
3. e = create lock(vptr, vMem, vresource),




By canonical forms, vptr = i : Int(I), and vMem = fact : Mem(I, Int(0)) so e
steps by (E CREATELOCK).
4. e = acquire(vLock, vptr),
where (T ACQUIRE)C`eLock:Lock(I,τ), eptr:Int(I)
C`acquire(eLock,eptr):τ
By canonical forms, vLock = lock : Lock(I, τ), and vptr = i : Int(I). Since R and
M are well typed under CRMe, ΘRMe(I) = 〈Mem(I, Int(J)), τ〉 and ΨRMe(I) =
Int(J) where J equals 0 or 1. If J = 0, then R(I) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(I) = 0
where vresource : τ . Therefore e steps by (E ACQUIRE1). If J = 1, then
R(I) = 〈fact〉 and M(I) = 1. Therefore e steps by (E ACQUIRE2).
5. e = release(vLock, vptr, vresource),
where (T RELEASE)C1`eLock:Lock(I,τ) eptr:Int(I) C2`eresource:τ
C1,C2`release(eLock,eptr,eresource):non〈〉
By canonical forms, vLock = lock : Lock(I, τ), vptr = i : Int(I), and vresource : τ .
Since R and M are well typed under CRMe, ΘRMe(I) = 〈Mem(I, Int(J)), τ〉 and
ΨRMe(I) = Int(J) where J equals 0 or 1. If J = 0, then R(I) = 〈fact, vresource〉
where vresource : τ and M(I) = 0. Therefore e steps by (E RELEASE2). If J =




erase([x 7→ v]e) = [x 7→ erase(v)] erase(e). Proof by induction on the expression e.
LEMMA [ERASE-TYPE-SUBSTITUTION]
erase([α 7→ τ ]e) = erase(e). Proof by induction on the expression e.
LEMMA [VALUE-ERASE-VALUE]
A value will always erase to a value. Proof by induction on the values. The proof is
the same as in[14] with the addition of a lock case and the changed tuple case.
1. erase(lock) = 〈〉 by (ER LOCK).
2. erase(φ〈v1, · · · , vn〉) = 〈vm, · · · , vn〉 for vj : t :
φ
i, i > 0 by (ER TUPLE). By
induction, each remaining value erases to another value.
All the value erase rules produce either values or the erase of another value.
LEMMA [ZERO-ERASE-VALUE]
If C ` v : τthen erase(v : t :
φ
0) = 〈〉. A value with kind
φ
0 will erase to 〈〉. Proof by
induction on the values. The proof is the same as in [14] with the addition of a lock
case and the changed tuple case.
1. By (ER LOCK) erase(fact) = 〈〉.




[α 7→ τ ]v is a value. Proof by induction on the values.
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LEMMA [TERM-SUBSTITUTION-VALUE]
[x 7→ v]v and [x 7→ fix x.v]v are values. Proof by induction on the values.
c Set
c is the set of expressions e which erase to a value.
c = i | b | cτ | φ〈−→c 〉 | λx : τ
φ
−→ e
| Λα : K.v | pack[τ1, c] as∃α : K.τ2 | fix x : τ :
φ
0 .v | fact | lock
LEMMA [C-ERASE-VALUE]
erase(c) = u. Proof by induction on c. The only new cases are lock and tuple. The
other cases are shown in [14].
1. By (ER LOCK), erase(lock) = 〈〉.
2. By (ER TUPLE), erase(φ〈−→c 〉) = 〈−→v 〉. By induction all the terms of the
erased tuple are either values or another erase(c).
erase(c) is either a value or another erase(c).
LEMMA [NON-C-ERASE-NON-VALUE]
If e 6= c then, erase(e) 6= u. Proof by induction on the expressions. The new cases
are createlock, acquire, and release. The other cases are shown in [14].
1. By (ER CREATELOCK), erase(create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource)) =
create lock( erase(eptr), erase(eMem), erase(eresource))
which is not a value.
2. By (ER ACQUIRE), erase(acquire(eLock, eptr)) =
acquire( erase(eLock), erase(eptr)) which is not a value.
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3. By (ER RELEASE), erase(release(eLock, eptr, ev)) =
release( erase(eLock), erase(eptr), erase(ev)) which is not a value.
All expressions which are not in c erase to non values (or do not erase).
csize function
The cases of csize are unchanged from [14]. Only the parts relevant to λconcurrent
are shown here. Define csize(c) as:
• csize(cτ) = 1 + csize(c)
• csize(φ〈−→c 〉) = sum(csize(ci))
• csize(pack[τ1, c] as∃α : K.τ2) = 1 + csize(c)
• csize(fix x : τ :
φ
0 .v) = 1
• csize(v) = 0
LEMMA [C-SIZE-DECREASES]
If C ` c : τ , where C has an empty ∆ and Γ, and (M, c) steps, then there is some c′
so that (M, c)
+
→ (M, c′) and csize(c) > csize(c′). Proof by induction on the possible
evaluation rules. In all cases we reach c′ by taking only one step. The cases are
unchanged from [14]. Only the parts relevant to λconcurrent are shown here.
1. (Λα : K.v)τ
(E TAPPTABS)
→ [α 7→ τ ]v. csize((Λα : K.v)τ) = 1. By Type-
Substitution-Value, [α 7→ τ ]v is a value so csize([α 7→ τ ]v) = 0.




→ [x 7→ fix x : t :
φ
0 .v]v. By Term-Substitution-Value,
[x 7→ fix x : t :
φ
0 .v]v is a value. csize(fix x : t :
φ
0) = 1 > 0
3. c
(congruence rule)c=E[c1]
→ c′. By induction, (M, c1) → (M, c
′
1) and csize(c1) >





If C ` c : τ , where C has an empty ∆ and Γ, then (M, c)
∗
→ (M, v). The proof is
shown in [14] and makes use of the C-Size-Decreases Lemma.
LEMMA [UNTYPED-NON-VALUES-STEP]
If C ` (R, M, e : τ) where C has an empty ∆ and Γ and erase(e) is a non value,
then erase((R, M, e)) → (L′, d′). Proof by induction on the expressions. The original
proof is shown in [14]. Cases for lock, createlock, acquire, and release are shown here.
1. e = lock, erase(e) is a value.
2. e = create lock(eptr, eMem, eresource) | acquire(eLock, eptr)
| release(eLck, eptr, eresource).
The proofs for all of these are similar so we will only show one.
e = acquire(eLock, eptr).
If eLock is a value, erase(acquire(eLock, eptr)) = acquire( erase(eLock), erase(eptr))
by
(ER ACQUIRE). If eptr = c, by C-Erase-Value erase(eptr) = uptr so erase(e) =
acquire(uptr,) and erase(e) can step by (D ACQUIRE1) or (D ACQUIRE2).
If eptr 6= c by Non-C-Erase-Non-Value erase(eptr) 6= u. By induction,
erase((R, M, eptr)) → (L
′, dptr) and erase(e) steps by the acquire congruence
rule.
If eLock is a not a value, erase(acquire(eLock, eptr)) =
let x = erase(eLock) in acquire( erase(eptr),) by (ER ACQUIREe0). By induc-
tion, erase((R, M, eLock)) → (L
′, dLock) and erase(e) steps by the let congruence
rule.
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B.6 Proof of Progress after Type Erasure
If e is a closed, well-typed expression (C ` e : τ for some τ and C = Ψ; Θ; ∅; ∅),
then the following statements hold:
1. (Erasure-Progress-1) If (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′) then
erase((R, M, e))
?
→ erase((R′, M ′, e′)).
2. (Erasure-Progress-2) If erase(e) is a value then
(R, M, e)
∗
→ (R′, M ′, v), erase((R, M, e)) = erase((R′, M ′, v)).
3. (Erasure-Progress-3) If erase((R, M, e)) → (L′, d′) then
(R, M, e)
+
→ (R′, M ′, e′), erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′).
In the cases where e does not affect locks, (R = R′), (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′) is
abbreviated to (M, e) → (M ′, e′). Similarly, in the cases where e does not affect
memory, (M = M ′), (M, e) → (M ′, e′) is abreviated to e → e′. The cases involving
create lock, acquire, and release affect locks and the cases involving loads, stores,
and congruence rules have the potential to affect memory. The cases which are
unchanged from [14] have been omitted.
THEOREM [Erasure-Progress-1]
C ` (R, M, e : τ) (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′)
erase((R, M, e))
?
→ erase((R′, M ′, e′))
If (R, M, e) evaluates in one step to (R′, M ′, e′), then erase((R, M, e)) evaluates
in zero or one steps to erase((R′, M ′, e′)). Proof by induction on the typed evaluation
rules. Most cases do not differ from [14] and have been ommitted. The load and
store cases are shown along with the cases for createlock, acquire, and release.
There are several cases for this proof. For each, we list the evaluation rules which
follow the case and show one proof. The other proofs in each case can be obtained
using a similar proof to the example.
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• Case: (R, M, e) → (R′, M ′, e′) using a typed evaluation rule and
erase((R, M, e)) → erase((R′, M ′, e′)) using the corresponding untyped (or
typed) evaluation rule.
1. (E LOAD)If e
(E LOAD)
→ e′ then (M, e) = (M, load(i, fact)) and (M ′, e′) = (M, lin
〈M(i), fact〉).
2. (E STORE) If e
(E STORE)
→ e′ then (M, e) = (M, store(i, fact, v)) and (M ′, e′) =
([i 7→ v]M, fact).
3. (E CREATELOCK) If e
(E CREATELOCK)
→ e′ then
(R, M, e) = (R, M, create lock(i, fact, vresource)) where M(i) = 0 and (R
′, M ′, e′) =
([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, M, lock).
4. (E ACQUIRE1) If e
(E ACQUIRE1)
→ e′ then (R, M, e) = (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and M(i) = 0 and (R
′, M ′, e′) = ([i 7→ 〈fact〉]R, [i 7→
1]M, vresource).
5. (E ACQUIRE2) If e
(E ACQUIRE2)
→ e′ then (R, M, e) = (R, M, acquire(lock, i))
where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1 and (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, acquire(lock, i)).
6. (E RELEASE1) If e
(E RELEASE)
→ e′ then
(R, M, e) = (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource)) where R(i) = 〈fact〉 and M(i) = 1
and (R′, M ′, e′) = ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, [i 7→ 0]M, 〈〉).
7. (E RELEASE2) If e
(E RELEASE)
→ e′ then
(R, M, e) = (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource)) where R(i) = 〈fact, vresource〉 and
M(i) = 0 and (R′, M ′, e′) = (R, M, release(lock, i, vresource)).
Proof :
(E CREATELOCK) If e
(E CREATELOCK)
→ e′ then
(R, M, e) = (R, M, create lock(i, fact, vresource)) and
(R′, M ′, e′) = ([i 7→ 〈fact, vresource〉]R, M, lock). By (T CREATELOCK) M(i) = 0.
erase((R, M, e)) = ( erase(M), erase(e)) by (ER RMe) and (ER M).
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This equals (L, erase(create lock(i, fact, vresource))) =
(L, create lock( erase(i), erase(fact), erase(vresource))) by (ER CREATELOCK)
and equals (L, create lock(i, 〈〉, 〈〉)) by (ER i), (ER FACT ), and Zero Erase Value.
erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = ( erase(M ′), erase(e′)) by (ER RMe). This equals
(L′, erase(lock)) = (L′, 〈〉) by (ER LOCK) and (ER M). Finally,
(L, create lock(i, 〈〉, 〈〉))
(D CREATELOCK)
→ (L, 〈〉) where L(i) = 0 so
erase((R, M, e)) → erase((R′, M ′, e′)).
THEOREM [ERASURE-PROGRESS-2]
C ` (R, M, e : τ) where C has an empty ∆ andΓ erase(e) is a value
(R, M, e)
∗
→ (R, M, v), erase((R, M, e)) = erase((R, M, v))
The proof is unchanged with the addition of locks and is shown in [14]. It makes use
of the C-*Step-Value Lemma.
THEOREM [ERASURE-PROGRESS-3]
C ` (R, M, e : τ) where C has an empty ∆ andΓ erase((R, M, e)) → (L′, d′)
(R, M, e)
+
→ (R′, M ′, e′), erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = (L′, d′)
If erase(e) is not a value then, by Untyped-Non-Values-Step, erase((R, M, e))
evaluates to (L′, d′). Additionally, (R, M, e) evaluates in one or more steps to
(R′, M ′, e′), and erase((R′, M ′, e′))= (L′, d′). Proof by induction on the expressions.
Most cases are unchanged from [14] so we only show load and store along with lock,
createlock, acquire, and release.
1. Let e = lock
By Value-Erase-Value, erase(v) = u and Erasure-Progress-3 does not apply.
2. Let (R, M, e) = (R, M, load(eptr, eMem)) | (R, M, store(eptr, eMem, ev))
| (R, M, acquire(eLock, eptr)) | (R, M, create lock(eptr, eMem, ev))
| (R, M, release(eLock, eptr, ev))
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The proofs for these cases are similar. We will only show one of the proofs.
Let (R, M, e) = (R, M, load(eptr, eMem)).
erase((R, M, e)) = erase((R, M, load(eptr, eMem)))
= ( erase(M), erase(load(eptr, eMem))) = (L, load( erase(eptr), erase(eMem))
by (ER RMe), (ER M), and (ER LOAD).
If eptr and eMem are in c, erase(eptr) and erase(eMem) are values so by Erasure-2,
(M, eptr)
∗
→ (M, vptr) where erase(vptr) = erase(eptr) and
(M, eMem)
∗
→ (M, vMem) where erase(vMem) = erase(eMem). By (T LOAD),
erase(eptr) = i and erase(eMem) = 〈〉. erase((R, M, e)) = (L, load(i, 〈〉))
(D LOAD)
→
(L, 〈L(i), 〈〉〉) = (L′, d′).
(R, M, e) =
(R, M, load(eptr, eMem))
∗,(congruence rule)E[e]=load(e,e2)
→ (R, M, load(vptr, eMem))
∗,(congruence rule)E[e]=load(v,e)
→ (R, M, load(vptr, vMem)) = (R, M, load(i, fact)) by Canon-
ical forms and (T LOAD). (R, M, load(i, fact))
(E LOAD)
→ (R, M, lin 〈M(i), fact〉)
= (R′, M ′, e′).
erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = erase((R, M, lin 〈M(i), fact〉)) = (L, 〈L(i), 〈〉〉) = (L′, d′).
If eptr is in c but eMem is not, erase(eptr) is a value so by Erasure-2, (M, eptr)
∗
→
(M, vptr) where erase(vptr) = erase(eptr). eMem is not a value so erase((M, eMem)) →
(L′, dMem) by Progress and (M, eMem)
+
→ (M ′, e′Mem) and erase((M
′, e′Mem)) =
(L′, dMem) by induction.
By (T LOAD), erase(eptr) = i. erase((R, M, e)) = (L, load(i, erase(eMem))) →
(L′, load(i, dMem)) = (L
′, d′).
(R, M, e) = (R, M, load(eptr, eMem))
∗,(congruence rule)E[e]=load(e,e2)
→ (R, M, load(vptr, eMem))
+,(congruencerule)E[e]=load(v,e)
→ (R′, M ′, load(vptr, e
′
Mem))
= (R′, M ′, load(i, e′Mem)) by Canonical forms and (T LOAD). = (R
′, M ′, e′).
erase((R′, M ′, e′)) = erase((R′, M ′, load(i, e′Mem))) = (L
′, load(i, dMem)) = (L
′, d′).
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If eptr is not in c, eptr is not a value so erase((M, eptr)) → (L




→ (M ′, e′ptr) and erase((M
′, e′ptr)) = (L
′, dptr) by induction.
erase((R, M, e)) =
(L, load( erase(eptr), erase(eMem))) → (L
′, load(dptr, erase(eMem))) = (L
′, d′).
(R, M, e) =
(R, M, load(eptr, eMem))
∗,(congruence rule)E[e]=load(e,e2)
→ (R′, M ′, load(e′ptr, eMem))
= (R′, M ′, e′).
erase((R′, M ′, e′)) =
erase((R′, M ′, load(e′ptr, eMem))) = (L
′, load(dptr, erase(eMem)) = (L
′, d′).
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C Lock Implementation in Clay
This implementation of locks is done in Clay and matches the abstract syntax in
Appendix A.
Included Clay types and functions
type Int[I] = native
@type0 Mem[int I, int T] = native
typedef Ptr[int I, int T] = @[Int[I], Mem[I,T]]
The above types are needed to implement locks. Int[I] is a singleton integer and
a pointer to memory location I. Mem is the memory State Type which tracks a word
of linear memory. Mem[I, T ] means that memory location I contains a value of type
Int[T ]. Ptr[I, T ] is a linear pair of a pointer to linear memory and its associated
Mem.
Locks in Clay
The Clay lock code defines the basic lock type and functions and implements the
outer lock creation function.
// Lock0 is the lock type. Lock is a Lock0 and a lock bit pointer
type0 Lock0[int Bit, @type0 Resource] = native
typedef Lock[int Bit, @type0 Resource] =
.[Lock0[Bit, Resource], Int[Bit]]
// Lock creation functions
native Lock0[B,R] create_lock0
[@type0 R, int B] (R resource, Mem[B,0] bit) limited[0];
Lock[B,R] create_lock
[@type0 R, int B] (R resource, Ptr[B,0] bit_ptr)
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{
let (bit_addr, bit_mem) = bit_ptr;
let lock0 = create_lock0(resource, bit_mem);
return .(lock0, bit_addr);
}
// Lock acquire function
native R acquire [int B, @type0 R] (Lock[B,R] lock);
// Lock release function
native void release [int B, @type0 R] (Lock[B,R] lock, R resoure);
Locks in C
The C lock code implements the types and functions declared (unlimited) native in
the Clay lock code.
// Acquire function sets a lock bit to 1 when it becomes 0.
void acquire(unsigned long lock)
{
int a = 1;
while (a == 1)
a = atomic_test_and_set(*((int *)lock)); // assembly x86 btsl
}
// Release function sets a lock bit to 0 when it becomes 1.
void release(unsigned long lock)
{
int a = 0;
while (a == 0)




In my abstract machine, the lock type and access expressions need to be added to
the syntax and rules before I prove soundness. A Lock is an example of a state
type which takes another state type as a parameter. Like Mem, locks needs their
own environments R and Θ to hold the linear resources and their types. Further
state types also need to be added individually with their access expressions, and
environments before soundness can be re-proven.
State types could be expressed through consolidated typing and kinding rules
with only 2 new environments. However, the downsides to this approach cause this
abstract machine to have just as many evaluation rules as my abstract machine so I
decided for simplify to add state types such as locks as needed.
consolidated environments
S = {σ1 7→ K1, · · · , σn 7→ Kn}
T = {χ1 7→ τ1, · · · , χn 7→ Kn}
C = Ψ; T, ∆; Γ
S is the state kind environment which maps state types (such as Mem) to kinds.
If Mem was removed from the abstract machine and replaced with a state type, the




0 meaning Mem takes a kind int
and a kind non-linear size 0 and has type linear size 0.
T is the state type environment which maps state type operations (such as load)
to types. Keeping the Mem example,
T (load) = Λα : int, β :
non
1 . lin 〈Mem(α, β), Int(α)〉 →lin 〈Int(β), Mem(α, β)〉
which means that load takes a singleton integer (a pointer) and a matching Mem
147




C ` χ : T (χ)
consolidated kinding rules
(K STATE)∆ ` σ : S(σ)
The above syntax and rules would add state types to the abstract machine. This
would allow all state types values to be expressed by one type and aid polymorphism.
The same principle could be applied to configuration types. However, the state
type operations include any expressions or operations which take state types as
arguments. Using these operations would require a list of constants for the operations
(load, store, set irq, ...) and an evaluation rule for each operation ((E LOAD),
(E STORE), ...). As this would not drastically shorten an abstract machine which
includes the many state and configuration types needed by an operating system, this
abstract machine does not use the consolidated state and configuration types.
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